Election Rules Review

2026 Expanded Edition

A review and assessment of the election rules in the United States and selected countries world-wide



Produced by The Meyers Report

October 20, 2026

Gary Meyers
Lincolnshire, IL 60069
Direct: (224) 715-5555
Email: Gary@TheMeyersReport.com
https://meyersreport.news/

Executive Summary

Why we did this survey

There have long been reports of United States (US) election system anomalies that could affect the outcomes of state and national elections. As a result, a significant portion of the public has lost confidence in the integrity of the United States election systems. The US General Accounting Office (GAO) report 20-267 released in 2020 cited multiple threats to the United States election processes and outcomes. We decided to conduct a survey of election rules from a global perspective and compare them according to established risk management principles.

What we included

To determine if election systems are secure, in 2025 we analyzed current rules (election laws and policies) of the United States, including the 50 states and the District of Columbia (DC), as well as the rules of 36 countries spanning six continents. In 2026, we expanded our survey to include an additional 15 countries encompassing 75% of the world's population and 85% of total world GDP.

Scope of study

This study confines itself to the stated laws, rules, and policies of the Electoral Management Boards (EMB) for each state and nation. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to measure the compliance of how each state or nation is following their own rules. Compliance can vary within countries, states, counties, and precincts. It does not survey if election processes are audited or observed by independent organizations. When noting the relatively high scores that several totalitarian countries achieved in our rating system, we caution against inferring that their elections are conducted in a manner reflective of our scoring of their laws, rules, and policies.

Our methodology

We expanded our 2025 survey subset of 17 election risk areas to 31, based on inputs from subject matter experts (SMEs). These SMEs nominated the risk areas based on reviews of prior election survey reports, US national voting standards guidelines, current survey reports from other organizations, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) US election model, and a review of security controls for election-related security domains such as cybersecurity. **Note:** This survey is a monumental task and will be updated periodically to cover rule and situation changes. The Meyers Report welcomes any documented additions, changes, or corrections.

Scoring System

We developed a scoring system based on previous surveys, and applied weighting factors based on the risk importance of each of the 31 areas. Each country and US entity (state, DC) was assigned a score (on a scale of 0 to 100) based on their level of compliance with election best practices. These practices were derived from recommendations of many election integrity groups, as well as Carter-Baker commission findings and US Election Assistance Commission (EAC) guidelines.

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Our findings

US state scores ranged from 30 (California and Washington, D.C.) to 79 (Arkansas). The average US score was 53 points, with a median of 54. The standard deviation was 13.35, indicating a wide disparity among states. As a whole, the US state average was 32.3 points below the average of the 51 other nations surveyed. The scores of the other 51 countries ranged from 52 (Canada) to 99 (Rwanda). The average for other countries surveyed was 85.3 points, with a median of 89. The standard deviation was 11.8, indicating a modest disparity among countries.

The lower compliance score for the US combined with the wider spread among states suggests an inconsistent implementation of election safeguards among states. It highlights the consequences of minimum Federal security standards. The lack of a minimal Federal compliance standard allows compromised election integrity in low scoring states, which can directly impact all electors in the other states, and affect national election outcomes.

Note: The US scores came in lower than last year primarily because of the handling of citizenship documentation. The 2025 study gave full credit for requiring citizenship for voting. The 2026 survey reduced the points earned by an average of 6 points if there was little or no documentation required for proving citizenship.

Our analysis

To identify the root causes of the poor election compliance scores, we conducted a causal analysis. The findings indicate that some election systems were deliberately designed to allow manipulation of vote totals, enabling bad actors to secure victories for preferred candidates rather than reflecting the will of the voters.

Whether intentional or not, election rules in poorly scoring states are uniquely designed to produce the outcomes observed. The causes could be due to a lack of maturity in developing the rules, conscious decisions to weaken the security of elections, or a lack of actions to measure, improve or correct rules and standardize them across all states.

What we recommend

- Develop a standard method of objective risk assessment for all election systems based on a comprehensive risk management framework (RMF) covering every step of the election process. Utilize an election model based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
- Use the election risk management framework to conduct risk assessments of all states, territories and DC to identify compliance gaps in the laws and policies/procedures as well as their implementation at the state, county and precinct levels.
- Determine the minimum standard (appetite) for risk to secure election systems.
- Develop recommendations for improvement for the election compliance areas. Provide these recommendations to all states to allow them the opportunity to improve their compliance score.

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- Codify the election risk management framework in a federal statute, or in the interim as an Executive Order.
- Develop and implement methods for assessment, identification, improvement, and authorization for all election risks, similar to the current NIST cybersecurity risk management framework.
- Develop independent auditing procedures to provide periodic audits of election processes and activities. This will provide for accreditation of state systems in accordance with compliance standards.
- Establish state election process accreditation and authorization standards.

Model Election Laws

The Election Integrity network (EIN) has created a set of model election laws designed to elevate the maturity of election rules in US states. These laws are based on ten principles in the US Citizens Elections Bill of Rights. Both federal and state legislators can use these model laws to improve election risk scores and create a framework for integrity in every election in the US. We have provided a crosswalk to application of the Model Election Laws (July 2026 version) to the 31 questions in the survey. These laws could also be tailored and adopted by foreign countries.

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
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1. Introduction

Since the advent of electronic voting following the passage of the Federal Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002, there have been reports of election system anomalies that could have affected the outcomes of state and national elections. Because of the large number and types of voting anomalies, a significant portion of the public lost confidence in the integrity of the United States election systems. One such report is GAO 20-267 published on February 6, 2020. The report cited multiple threats to the election process.



Source: GAO analysis based on information reported by the Department of Homeland Security, the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and the Center for Internet Security. | GAO-20-267

Figure 1 US Election system processes

One solution to this issue is to follow best practices that have been proven over time for other similar systems. These practices exist for the key domains and components of our election systems. Because elections (state, local, and federal) are administered by the states, it is the responsibility of each individual state to ensure that risk has been identified and mitigated for all components of their election systems. (Note: when state is mentioned, it includes all 50 states and the District of Columbia.)

To evaluate the security of election systems, our study followed the scientific method to answer a central question: "**Are elections secure?**" We began by conducting background research on the laws and policies governing election systems in both the United States and selected foreign countries. This comparative analysis enabled us to develop a hypothesis about potential vulnerabilities in election systems and identify strategies to strengthen their security.

To test the hypothesis, we analyzed current laws and policies and compared them with current best practices for each security domain. The six election systems security domains include Physical Security,

Information Security, Personnel Security, Supply Chain Security, Chain of Custody, and Threat Management. These domains are universally accepted for mission assurance in the US Department of Defense and other mission assurance organizations. Based on an analysis of the critical election system processes, we developed a set of controls to mitigate weaknesses in election systems processes. The control questions are based on the NIST standards for risk management, including the SP800 series of guidance documents. These controls were then peer reviewed by subject matter experts against domain standards to ensure a high level of maturity in the assessment process.

Election processes of the Federal government, 50 states and the District of Columbia, and 51 countries were reviewed based on published election rules (laws and policies/procedures). Each entity (state and country) was assigned a score based on the level of compliance with the best practice for critical election system processes.

The research data was then analyzed by an independent peer review to validate procedures, data accuracy and subsequent analyses. The findings were published along with a root cause analysis of weaknesses, and our recommended opportunities for improvement to mitigate the election risk areas.

Note: This report was created, executed, and funded internally by The Meyers Report and its members. The report does not have an agenda. It is not sponsored or funded by any other organization or political group.

Note: This report is about elections for national office and does not consider state and local elections, which often have different rules. The information gathered during the research process was taken from a variety of sources which were deemed reliable. We cannot guarantee the accuracy, completeness, consistency, or reliability of the source information in all cases. (See the bibliography.) The sources are provided in case the reader would like to research the source material.

Respectfully,
Gary Meyers, Barry Chapman, Jay Delancy, Edie Meyers

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2. Methodology

2.1 Concept

We decided to use a methodology based on the following concepts:

- The Scientific Method
- Structured Analytic Techniques for data analysis
- Standards, including Risk Management Frameworks and best practices
- Use of concepts developed for prior election rules analysis
- Use of statistics and graphical displays to present the findings

1. Observe and question (scientific method step 1)

We observed the state of election rules (laws and procedures) in the United States and noticed a wide variety of rules from state to state and even at the County and local levels. We reviewed similar efforts to survey election rules, including the following: (a) the 2005 Carter-Baker Commission report that reviewed election rules for the US and several countries, and (b) the Heritage Foundation report that conducted state surveys of rules along 14 risk areas and found a wide range of compliance scores with respect to risk management.

2. Conduct research

Our observations led us to a finding that the US National election system had a high degree of risk due to poor rules in some states. We decided to conduct additional research on 31 election rules areas and assign scores for each area for each state. A scoring system was developed based on a risk assessment of the impact a noncompliant rule would have on election results. This system was based on current risk management frameworks for the election domains, such as the NIST cybersecurity framework (SP 800 series).

3. Develop a hypothesis

We developed a hypothesis that failure to properly address risk in a state election system could lead to weaknesses that could be exploited by bad actors. These weaknesses, or gaps, could result in an incorrect election result. This hypothesis was confirmed by the US General Accounting Office Report GAO 20-267 published on February 6, 2020.

4. Test with experiment

We tested our hypothesis by reviewing election rules of 51 countries and comparing their scores to the US states. Researchers in different countries reviewed rules from published sources to gather the data for analysis. We used the Delphi method to employ geographically dispersed analysts to reduce confirmation bias and allow discussion of observations from different perspectives.

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5. Analyze the data

The data from 50 US states plus DC and 51 countries were analyzed. We used structured analytic techniques and System 2 thinking to conduct the analysis. This included the following: (1) Gather and analyze data. (2) Look for relationships in the data and use the Delphi method to bring in geographical diverse analysis. (3) Assess the possibility of deception, using tools to detect propaganda and reduce confirmation bias. (4) Develop conclusions and courses of action by quantitative analysis using scoring and statistics. (5) Use causal analysis to determine the gaps and root causes that drive the recommendations. (6) Present the data in a visual format, including charts, graphs, and tables.

6. Develop conclusions and report

We developed conclusions based on our observations of the data and used statistical tools and graphs to present the data for review. 50 US states plus DC and 51 countries were reviewed across 31 domains, with scoring set for a range of 0 to 100 based; the lowest compliance equals 0 and highest compliance equals 100.

7. Follow-on recommendations

This includes any additional research identified as a part of this survey, including correlating risk scores to political control, predicting risk based on likelihood of intent, and any additional research required to confirm the root cause analysis, including fishbone diagrams.

2.2 Premise and Procedures

The following survey examines written election rules for all 50 US states and the District of Columbia and compares those rules to those of 51 other countries in Western and Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia, South America, and Pacific Oceania (including Australia). The countries selected were chosen for size, geographic diversity, their political relevance, and with The Meyers Report (TMR) having overseas contacts who assisted with the verification of survey data and its interpretation.

This is a study of "election rules" only. The study does not consider whether the US states and the selected countries implement and enforce their own rules (compliance). It does not survey if election processes are audited or observed by independent organizations.

"Best practice" election process

Our definition of a "best practice" election process comes from a combination of findings in the 2005 Carter-Baker Commission report along with the common public practices generally complied with by 75% or more of the countries surveyed. The Carter-Baker Commission warned that the two greatest dangers to the American election system were "mail-in ballots" and "the lack of voter identification". These areas were given a higher weighting due to their importance.

Premise

A best practice election system has the following characteristics:

- The consistent chain of custody is never broken.

- Only citizens should be eligible and allowed to vote.
- All voters should have a government photo ID that verifies the voter is the legal voter and is eligible to vote in a specific election in the appropriate voting district.
- Voters should have privacy so that they can be free to vote their conscience without intimidation or fear of repercussions on their lives.
- Election results should be timely and verifiable through recounts and audits.
- Voters should have access to voter roll lists at no cost or a reasonable cost.

Resolve

- Does the United States federal government have "best practice election procedures?"
- Do all 50 US states including the District of Columbia have consistent "best practice election procedures?"
- How do the election laws of the US and those of the individual states compare to each other and other countries in the world?

The study employed the following procedures for data gathering and verification for accuracy.

1. **Criteria for election procedures**
   These criteria were selected by election experts in the United States and in other countries in Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. They follow the same areas as selected for previous election research, and add new criteria based on recent analysis of election systems risk areas.

   Surveyed areas of election risk:

   From the above premises, the following election risk areas were chosen for the survey:

   1. Citizenship Required
   2. Citizen Only Vote Documentation
   3. Same Day Registration
   4. Ranked Choice Voting
   5. Early In Person Voting
   6. Mail In Ballots
   7. Absentee Ballot Qualification
   8. Absentee Ballot Delivery
   9. Total Mail in Ballot Days
   10. Ballots Accepted After Election Day
   11. Ballot Harvesting
   12. NCOA Voter Roll Maintenance
   13. Address Change Frequency
   14. Death Updates for Voter Rolls
   15. Felon Registration for Voter Rolls
   16. Citizenship Documentation for Voter Rolls
   17. Third Party Registration Drives

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18. Third Party Roll Maintenance
19. Govt Control Third Party Maintenance
20. Public Registration List Challenges
21. Voter Id For Voting
22. Average Precinct Size
23. Paper Ballots Only
24. Fingers Marked
25. Hand Or Optical Scan Counting versus DRE with no paper ballot
26. Machines Audited Certified
27. Machine Updates After Certification
28. Post Election Audits
29. Quick Election Results
30. Public Access Voter Rolls
31. Cost Access Voter Rolls

These risk areas were mapped to the US Election System Model Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) by category and process:

WBS	Category	Process	Control
1.2	Manage voters	Verify citizenship	1. Citizenship Required
1.2	Manage voters	Verify citizenship	2. Citizen Only Vote Documentation
1.2	Manage voters	Receive voter registration	3. Same Day Registration
1.5	Prepare voting material	Maintain Precinct Boundaries	22. Average Precinct Size
1.5	Prepare voting material	Lay Out Ballots	23. Paper Ballots Only
1.5	Prepare voting material	Perform Accuracy Testing	26. Machines Audited Certified
1.5	Prepare voting material	Provide report validation	27. Machine Updates After Certification
2.1	Vote in person	Determine remote voting eligibility	5. Early In Person Voting
2.1	Vote in person	Determine Initial Eligibility	21. Voter Id For Voting
2.1	Vote in person	Determine Initial Eligibility	24. Fingers Marked
2.2	Vote remotely	Send Ballot by Mail	6. Mail In Ballots
2.2	Vote remotely	Is requester eligible?	7. Absentee Ballot Qualification
2.2	Vote remotely	Mail package to voter	8. Absentee Ballot Delivery
2.2	Vote remotely	Voting period begins	9. Total Mail in Ballot Days
2.2	Vote remotely	Ballots received and processed	10. Ballots Accepted After Election Day
2.2	Vote remotely	Receive ballot package	11. Ballot Harvesting
3.1	Determine results	Tally Ballots	4. Ranked Choice Voting
3.1	Determine results	Tally	25. Hand Or Optical Scan Counting

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3.1	Determine results	Verify Vote Count	28. Post Election Audits
3.1	Determine results	Certify/Publish Official Results	29. Quick Election Results
1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	NVRA General Program	12. NCOA Voter Roll Maintenance
1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Confirmed current address	13. Address Change Frequency
1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Process Death Records	14. Death Updates for Voter Rolls
1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Process Court Actions	15. Felon Registration for Voter Rolls
1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Remove non-citizens	16. Citizenship Documentation for Voter Rolls
1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Verify registration is complete	17. Third Party Registration Drives
1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Receive voter registration	18. Third Party Roll Maintenance
1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Receive voter registration	19. Govt Control Third Party Maintenance
1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Lookup voter record	20. Public Registration List Challenges
1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Check for completeness	30. Public Access Voter Rolls
1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Lookup voter record	31. Cost Access Voter Rolls

Figure 2 Election system risk areas

2. Procedures for data gathering

a. A team of seven primary researchers from four countries were selected, who were attending schools in the United States, the UK, and Portugal. These researchers have training in statistics, data analysis, history, economics, and world affairs.
b. The research team was supervised by people experienced in research studies and analysis, and knowledgeable in the subject of elections, standards, models, frameworks, and in diplomacy and foreign relations.

3. Data gathering and verification

a. First round: the study areas were divided equally among the surveyors, who examined government websites, national constitutions (where applicable), and other legal documents involving election laws and regulations.
b. Second round: the work of each surveyor was then shifted to another member of the survey team who then reviewed and checked that work.
c. Third round: the total body of data was then reviewed by the project director and two experts in the election integrity field.
d. Fourth round: international election surveyed rules were then reviewed by organizations and people in those regions, for Latin America, Africa, Europe, Asia and Oceania. Data for the 50 US states and DC were reviewed by individuals in the US with specific knowledge of the states.
e. Fifth round: the original survey team then adjusted where needed and then reviewed the survey yet another time.

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4. **Risk and compliance assessment**
   A scoring system was developed to compare risk and compliance assessment of election systems across the 31 risk areas for all US and foreign entities surveyed. This system produced a scale of 0 to 100 for a compliance score, where 0 was the lowest compliance and 100 was the highest. The scoring was in accordance with the 2005 Carter-Baker Commission grading system and the best practices of the nations surveyed, with scores created for the 31 risk areas.

5. **Observations**
   Observations were made based on the data gathered, including score ranges for each of the 31 areas, the US states, and the 51 countries. Average scores were compiled for the US states, 51 countries, and five regions. The standard deviation was calculated for the US states and for the 51 countries. Comparison charts were developed for the US states, regions, and countries for each of the 31 risk areas.

6. **Additional Verification**
   The observations made were again reviewed by the supervising team for logic, consistency and for determination levels of relevance and importance. For the final review, a panel expert in elections, governments, research, and diplomacy reviewed the research, methodology and results for accuracy and logic. The panel also looked for outlier results, which were then re-examined and verified or corrected.

7. **Conclusions**
   The Meyers Report (TMR) drew conclusions based on collected observations of the collated data, of interviews conducted with election experts, and from contributors in the different countries on six continents surveyed. TMR conducted causal analyses to determine the root causes of high election risk.

8. **Recommendations**
   From the reviewed observations, conclusions were drawn, and recommendations were developed. A causal analysis was conducted to determine the root causes of election risk.

9. **Final report and review**
   The final report was then reviewed again before releasing the report. The report examines the risk gaps in each area and provides recommendations for improvement in the form of revisions to the procedures of surveyed items. This report is limited to the 31 risk areas surveyed. To conduct complete authorization and assessment, controls would have to be developed for the 646 processes in the US election system model and used to assess all processes for a complete gap analysis.

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10. Notes

a. There is significant variability of processes within a state based on the interpretation of state laws and policies by county and local (precinct) government. The state assessment score will be a composite of these processes.

b. The survey used 31 risk areas to cover most threats to election processes. Due to time and resource constraints, this choice provides a high-level assessment in a reasonable time frame.

c. The survey is designed so that it can be updated as laws/policies are changed, and that scoring and weighting factors can be updated as the process matures.

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3. Scoring criteria

Election system risk areas and explanation of grading

Grading system
A weighted grading system (in accordance with the 2005 Carter-Baker Commission) was created for each of the variables (see explanation below) and then aggregated for a score for each surveyed governing entity ranging from 0 to 100 (with 100 being the highest). The weighted grading system was created by the supervisor team and election experts in accordance with the recommendations of the Carter-Baker Commission and the percentage of countries following the publicly identified procedures.

Grading and Observations
Upon completion and review of data gathering, observations were listed, and the grading formulas were applied to the surveyed areas in accordance with the established criteria, which became part of the observations.

Grading values
The 31 risk areas were weighted (varying from 1 point to 11 points) based on the probability of occurrence and the severity of the threat. This resulted in a maximum top score of 100 points. Points were awarded from zero to the maximum for the areas based on the amount of compliance of the election rule to the practice standard for minimum risk for the specific area.

Scoring
Each state and each country were scored by adding points from the 31 risk areas to arrive at a total compliance score for the entity. The aggregate scoring goes from 0 (the lowest compliance/highest risk) election standards to 100 (highest compliance/lowest risk.)

States and countries were color coded based on the following letter grades:

A: 92 – 100 (Green)
B: 82 – 91 (Blue)
C: 75 – 81 (Yellow)
D: 65 – 74 (Orange)
F: 64 or less (Red)

4. Observations

This paper draws out what the survey data say when the 50 U.S. states, plus the District of Columbia (51 US jurisdictions), are read as a group and compared to the 51 countries also surveyed. The study grades

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the rules as written, what constitutions, statutes and regulations permit or require, not how those rules are administered. Group averages below are recomputed from a matrix of 31 election risk factors for each of the states and countries. Numbers under 10 are spelled out in the text; scores, question numbers and percentages are shown as figures.

Scores at a glance:

Group	Count	Average	Median	Range	Grades
All U.S. jurisdictions	51	53.0	54	30–79	3 C, 8 D, 40 F
Red states (Trump 2024)	24	62.1	63	39–79	3 C, 7 D, 14 F
Swing states (2024 battlegrounds)	7	52.7	54	35–68	1 D, 6 F
Blue states and D.C. (Harris 2024)	20	42.2	40.5	30–64	20 F
All 51 countries	51	85.3	89	52–99	19 A, 20 B, 4 C, 2 D, 6 F
Free-market democracies	28	82.9	—	—	—
Western Europe	10	78.6	—	62–97	—
Australia and the Pacific	2	57.0	—	54–60	—

Figure 3 Election survey observations

4.1 Observations on U.S. Election Rules

1. **US Scores.** No US jurisdiction earned an A or a B. The 51 jurisdictions average 53 out of 100 and the median is 54. Three earn a C (Arkansas 79, Mississippi 78, Indiana 76), eight earn a D, and 40, nearly four in five, earn an F. The spread from top to bottom is 49 points, California and the District of Columbia at 30 to Arkansas at 79.

2. **Counting.** The United States counts well and verifies poorly. On the eight questions about equipment, counting and roll maintenance (Q12 through Q15, Q23, Q25, Q26, Q27) every jurisdiction scores at or near the maximum: certified machines, no post-certification changes, paper ballots in 43 jurisdictions, optical scanning in 50, and NCOA, death and felon updates on a statutory schedule everywhere. The average jurisdiction loses fewer than one point across all eight.

3. **US weaknesses.** Two questions account for a third of everything the average US state loses. Voter identification (Q21) costs the average jurisdiction 8.0 of 10 points and mail-in ballot policy (Q6) costs 7.5 of 11. Together they are 15.5 of the 47.0 points the average jurisdiction leaves on the table. Only eight jurisdictions require a photo ID with no exception (Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Ohio, Tennessee, Wisconsin), and 40 score zero, meaning either no ID or an ID request with an affidavit or exception form. New Hampshire left the first group in May 2026 when a federal court restored its affidavit alternative.

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4. **Citizenship Verification.** Citizenship in the US is taken on faith almost everywhere, and in the rest of the world almost nowhere. Only four US jurisdictions require a document proving citizenship at registration (Arizona, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming) and nine require limited documentation; 38 accept a signed oath. Five jurisdictions (California, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maryland, Vermont) permit some non-citizen voting in local elections.

5. **Mail-in ballots.** The vote by mail process is where the chain of custody is lost. Nine jurisdictions mail a ballot to every registrant; 29 issue no-excuse absentee ballots on request; only 13 still require an excuse. Twenty jurisdictions allow ballot harvesting, where any person may collect and return an unlimited number of other voters' ballots, and only six prohibit third-party return. Sixteen US jurisdictions accept ballots that arrive after election day, some as late as 14 days (Illinois).

6. **Same-day and election-day registration** has become the norm outside the South. Twenty-four jurisdictions score zero on Q3, meaning registration at the polling place on election day; 24 prohibit it. Only three (Michigan, Vermont, Wisconsin) take the middle course of confining late registration to the clerk's office.

7. **Ranked-choice voting (RCV) is permitted by default** in most of the country. Twenty-one states prohibit it; 30 jurisdictions allow it, and it is in use in New York City, Maine, Alaska, Evanston and several other municipalities. Because most election codes are silent rather than prohibitive, a city charter can adopt it without the legislature acting.

8. **US Early voting days have increased.** Fifteen US jurisdictions run early in-person voting for more than 20 days (Illinois 40, Minnesota and South Dakota 46, Pennsylvania up to 50 through in-person delivery of mailed ballots), only 12 hold it to the survey's 10-day benchmark, and three (Alabama, Mississippi, New Hampshire) have no early voting. The average jurisdiction loses 2.7 of 4 points on this question.

9. **Registration drives and voter roll maintenance.** Third parties sit inside the voter registration and maintenance process. Forty-nine jurisdictions allow private registration drives, 30 rely on an outside consortium or vendor for cross-state matching, chiefly the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), and 28 leave a share of maintenance decisions outside government. Only 28 give the public a statutory way to challenge a specific registration. ERIC itself has lost nine member states since 2022: Louisiana, then Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia in 2023. The states cited ERIC's requirement that members mail registration invitations to every eligible but unregistered resident, the sharing of DMV data on non-voters with a private nonprofit, concerns over the role of the organization's founder and its perceived partisanship, and cost. ERIC dropped the founder from its board but kept the outreach mandate; Hawaii joined in 2024, New York in 2025, and Virginia was ordered back in by executive order in 2026. The departing states have not yet built a comparable cross-state matching system of their own.

10. **Election audits are weak links in an otherwise strong count system.** Only eight jurisdictions (Colorado, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, Rhode Island, Virginia, Wyoming) conduct a statistically valid, margin-based audit before certification; most run a fixed-percentage or procedural

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review, often after the canvass. Nine jurisdictions took three days or more to report 2024 election results.

4.2 How the United States compares with the rest of the World

1. **Scores.** The 51 countries average 85.3; the United States averages 53.0. Nineteen countries earn an "A" and 20 a "B" with no U.S. jurisdiction earning either. The best American score, Arkansas at 79, would rank 40th among the countries. Only 12 of the 51 countries score below Arkansas, and only one, Canada (52), scores below the U.S. average.

2. **Voter ID.** On the questions that do the verifying, the gap is not a matter of degree. Thirty-seven countries require a government photo ID with no exception; eight U.S. jurisdictions do. Thirty-nine countries require documentary proof of citizenship; four U.S. jurisdictions do. Forty-eight countries close registration before election day; 24 U.S. jurisdictions do. The country average on voter ID is 82% of the available points; the U.S. average is 20%.

3. **Vote-by-mail.** The world does not vote by mail. Thirty-nine of the 51 countries prohibit mail voting altogether and eight more allow it only with an excuse; four allow no-excuse or universal mail voting. In the United States 38 jurisdictions allow no-excuse or universal mail voting. This one question (Q6) is the largest single difference between the two groups, 6.3 points on the 11-point scale.

4. **Absentee voting.** Where mail or absentee voting exists abroad, the ballot rarely leaves official hands. Forty-seven countries require in-person delivery of an absentee ballot to an election office or polling place; 13 U.S. jurisdictions do. Forty-six countries prohibit third-party ballot collection; six U.S. states do. Forty-six countries issue absentee ballots no more than 10 days before the election; 13 U.S. jurisdictions do.

5. **Governments keep control of the register.** All 51 countries keep list maintenance inside government and 47 confine registration to government; in the United States the figures are 23 and two. Forty-five countries provide a public challenge process against 28 U.S. jurisdictions.

6. **The United States leads the world in three places.** Every U.S. jurisdiction runs National Change of Address (NCOA), death and felon updates on a statutory schedule; only 39, 37 and 43 countries respectively do. Every U.S. jurisdiction limits its rolls to citizens in state and federal elections; only 25 countries earn full marks because several allow resident non-citizens to vote locally. And 35 U.S. jurisdictions sell the voter file for under $1,000, against 29 countries; 22 countries charge more than $10,000 or do not sell it.

7. **The United States reports faster.** Thirty-nine U.S. jurisdictions reported 2024 results within a day, against 33 countries, and 12 countries took three days or more. Paper ballots, optical scanning and certification are equally universal on both sides; on those questions the two groups are tied.

8. **Democracies score better, and dictatorships set the bar.** Free-market democracies average 82.9, socialist-leaning democracies 85.3, and the authoritarian group 90.2. The authoritarian average is high because dictatorships post rules that make their elections look legitimate: photo ID with no

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exception, documentary proof of citizenship, a closed register, no mail voting, election-day receipt, government-only maintenance. Whether those regimes follow their own rules is a separate question the survey cannot answer, and in most of them the answer appears to be no. But the rules themselves are the point. Even governments that have no intention of holding an honest election know what an honest election's rules look like, and they write them down. That is the bar, and the United States does not meet it on paper.

9. **The English-speaking world is the exception that resembles America.** The five lowest-scoring countries after Somalia are Canada (52), Australia (54), New Zealand (60), Ireland (62) and the United Kingdom (64), all common-law democracies that rely on attestation and postal voting. Germany (66) and Spain (73) are the only continental European countries below 75. The American pattern is a common-law pattern, not a democratic one.

10. **Finger-marking is the one difference that is not about verification.** Eighteen countries mark a voter's finger with indelible ink; no U.S. jurisdiction does. Every U.S. jurisdiction loses the two points, and the practice is not on any American legislative agenda.

4.3 Blue, Red and Swing States

1. **Partisan gap is 20 points.** The 24 states carried by Trump in 2024 average 62.1; the seven battleground states average 52.7; the 19 states and the District of Columbia carried by Harris average 42.2. All three C-grade states are red, seven of the eight D-grade states are red (Georgia, a swing state, is the eighth), and all 20 blue jurisdictions earn an "F." The exceptions run both ways: New Hampshire, a blue state, is the highest-scoring blue jurisdiction at 64, and Alaska, a red state, scores 39. (Note: a May 2026 federal court ruling restored New Hampshire's affidavit alternatives to its photo ID and proof-of-citizenship laws, which had been the strictest in the US. The ruling cost New Hampshire seven points and a full letter grade, from D to F.)

2. **The gap is not in the count.** On equipment, counting and roll maintenance the three groups are within a point or two of each other. The gap is in verification and chain of custody: red states average 30% of the available points on citizenship documentation, blue states 3%; red states 74% on same-day registration, blue states 24%; red states 83% on prohibiting ranked-choice voting (RCV), blue states 0%.

3. **Voter ID divides all three groups, not just two.** Blue states average 0% of the available points on Q21 and red states only 32%, because most red states keep an affidavit or exception form. Swing states average 40%, the highest of the three, carried by Georgia and Wisconsin.

4. **Mail voting is where blue states lose the most.** Blue states average 21% of the available points on mail-in policy (Q6), 10% on in-person delivery (Q8) and 21% on the mailing window (Q9); red states average 43%, 46% and 52%. Seven of the nine universal-mail jurisdictions are blue; 11 of the 13 excuse-required states are red.

5. **Swing states are strict on deadlines and open on everything else.** The battlegrounds scored 86% on the election-day receipt deadline, better than red states (79%) and far better than blue (50%), and 100% on public challenge processes. But swing states score 0% on in-person absentee delivery and

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11% on the mailing window, the lowest of the three groups, because all seven allow drop boxes and long absentee windows.

6. **Swing states are not a bloc.** Georgia (68) and Wisconsin (58) score above the national average; Nevada (35) is among the five lowest jurisdictions in the country; North Carolina (47), Michigan (52), Pennsylvania (54) and Arizona (55) sit in the middle. The 33-point spread inside the battleground group is larger than the gap between the red and blue averages.

7. **Blue states audit better than red states.** Seven of the eight jurisdictions with a margin-based audit before certification are blue or swing (Colorado, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, Rhode Island, Virginia; Wyoming is the only red state); blue states average 62% on Q28 against 40% for red states. Blue states also keep smaller precincts than swing states (60% versus 50%), though red states lead both at 81%.

8. **Red states report faster and open the rolls wider.** Red states average 92% on same-night results against 68% for blue states, and 71% on public access to the voter file against 45%. Five of the nine jurisdictions that took three days or more to report 2024 results are blue.

9. **Where a state sits on the map matters as much as how it votes.** The Southeast (Tennessee 74, Alabama 73, Kentucky 69, Georgia 68) and the lower Midwest (Indiana 76, Ohio 71, Missouri 65) hold most of the top scores; the Northeast (Vermont 37, Maine 40, Massachusetts 41, New York 42, Connecticut 44) and the Pacific coast (California 30, Oregon 37, Washington 39) hold most of the bottom. New Hampshire (64) and Virginia (36) are the outliers in each region.

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5. Analysis

The following figures show risk scores for the US and other nations for each of the 31 risk areas.

Figure 4: US States and D.C. vs. the World (US States worse)

Figure 4 ranks all 50 states and D.C. against the world averages. Only 11 US jurisdictions reach the 65-point pass line, led by Arkansas (79), Mississippi (78) and Indiana (76), and none earns an A or B. The other 40 earn an F, down to California and D.C. at 30. The US average of 53.0 is below every regional average and the 85.3 average of all other countries.




Figure 4 US Election rules comparison to other nations

Figure 5: The 51 Other Nations vs. the US Average (US States worse)

Figure 5 ranks the 51 other nations. Forty-five pass the 65-point line, 19 earn an A and 20 a B, led by Rwanda (99), Turkey (98) and Taiwan (98). Fifty of the 51 score above the US average of 53.0. Canada (52) is the only exception, and Australia (54), New Zealand (60), Ireland (62), Somalia (63) and the United Kingdom (64) are the only other nations that fail.




Figure 5 Election rules of other nations compared to the US

Figure 6: US Average vs. Continental Averages and the World (US States worse)

Figure 6 ranks the US average score vs the averages of the countries across the continents. All pass the 65 point line except for the US and Australia/Pacific Rim.




Figure 6 US average scores versus continental averages

Regional Scores

Average, high and low scores for the US States, the other nations and the world regions, then each region country by country

Figure 7 Average Scores by Region




Figure 7: Average Scores by Region

US States worse

The US States average 53.0, an F, the lowest of any group in the survey. The other nations average 85.3, a B, 32 points higher. Eastern Europe leads at 91.3, followed by South America (89.7), Africa (89.0) and Asia (88.2). Even the two lowest regions, Australia and the Pacific (57.0) and North America's Canada and Mexico (72.0), score above the US States.

Figure 8 Average, High and Low Scores by Region




Figure 8: Average, High and Low Scores by Region

US States worse

The US States have both the lowest score in the survey (30, California and D.C.) and the widest range. The best US score, Arkansas at 79, is below the average of four of the seven regions and below the 85.3 average of the other nations. The US average of 53.0 is lower than the lowest-scoring country in five of the seven regions.

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Figure 9 Africa




Figure 9: Africa

US States worse

Africa averages 89.0, a B, 36 points above the US States. Nine of its 10 countries score 87 or higher, led by Rwanda (99) and Morocco (97). Somalia, the region's lowest at 63, still scores 10 points above the US average.

Figure 10 Asia and the Middle East




Figure 10: Asia and the Middle East

US States worse

Asia and the Middle East average 88.2, a B, 35 points above the US States. Taiwan and Turkey lead at 98. India is the region's lowest at 77, still 24 points above the US average. Every country in the region earns an A, B or C.

Figure 11 Eastern Europe




Figure 11: Eastern Europe

US States worse

Eastern Europe is the highest-scoring region, averaging 91.3, 38 points above the US States. Every country scores between 86 (Poland and Russia) and 97 (Romania), and all nine earn an A or B. No region is more uniform.

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Figure 12 Western Europe




Figure 12: Western Europe

US States worse

Western Europe averages 78.6, a C, 26 points above the US States, with the widest spread of any foreign region. Italy (97) and Greece (96) earn A's, while the United Kingdom (64) and Ireland (62) earn F's. Even those two score nine or more points above the US average.

Figure 13 North America




Figure 13: North America (Canada and Mexico)

Mixed

North America splits sharply. Mexico scores 92, an A, 39 points above the US States. Canada scores 52, an F, and is the only nation in the survey that scores below the US average of 53.0, by one point. The two neighbors average 72.0, a D, 19 points above the US States.

Figure 14 South America




Figure 14: South America

US States worse

South America averages 89.7, a B, 37 points above the US States. Argentina (97), Chile (95) and Colombia (92) earn A's. Brazil is the region's lowest at 78, held down by electronic voting without a paper ballot, yet it still scores 25 points above the US average.

Figure 15 Australia and the Pacific




Figure 15: Australia and the Pacific

US States worse


Australia and the Pacific is the region closest to the US States, averaging 57.0, an F. New Zealand scores 60 and Australia 54. Both still score above the US average of 53.0, Australia by just one point.

Scores by Question for all Entities

In addition, scores by question are also included in Appendix C for each of the US states and DC, and each country, followed by the grading scale and assigned scores for the 31 questions.

Scores for the 31 Risk Areas


Share of the 51 US jurisdictions and the 51 other nations meeting each rule



Q1: Citizen-Only Vote

US States better


Nine in 10 US jurisdictions (90%) limit every election to citizens, against about half (49%) of the other nations. Another 39% of the nations let non-citizens vote in local elections, compared with 10% of US jurisdictions. Six nations, including the United Kingdom and New Zealand, let some non-citizens vote in national elections. This is one of the few rules on which the US States clearly lead the world.



Q2: Proof of Citizenship to Register

US States worse

Seventy-six percent of the other nations require a document, such as a passport or birth certificate, to prove citizenship before a person can register, and another 12% require limited documentation. Only 8% of US jurisdictions (Arizona, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming) require documentation and 18% limited documentation. The other 75% accept a signed oath alone, against 12% of the nations.




Q3: No Same Day Registration

US States worse

Ninety-four percent of the other nations close registration before voting begins; fewer than half of US jurisdictions (47%) do. Twenty-four US jurisdictions let a person register and vote on the same day at the polls, which leaves no time to check the new registration against motor-vehicle, death or court records before the ballot is cast. Only three of the 51 nations allow it.


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Q4: Prohibits Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)

US States worse


Eighty-eight percent of the other nations prohibit ranked-choice voting (RCV); 41% of US jurisdictions do. The six nations that allow it are Australia, India, Ireland, New Zealand, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. Thirty US jurisdictions have not banned it, although most do not use it. RCV moves tabulation to central computers and produces exhausted ballots, which makes a count harder to verify by hand.



Q5: Days of Early In-Person Voting

US States worse

Seventy-six percent of the other nations prohibit early in-person voting and another 14% hold it to 10 days or less. In the US, only 6% prohibit it (Alabama, Mississippi and New Hampshire) and 24% hold it to 10 days or less. Seven in 10 US jurisdictions allow about 20 days or more (41% about 20 days and 29% more than 20), against 10% of the nations.




Q6: Mail-in Ballot Policy

US States worse

Seventy-six percent of the other nations prohibit mail-in ballots and 16% require an excuse; none mails a ballot to every voter. No US jurisdiction prohibits mail ballots. A quarter (25%) require an excuse, 57% let anyone request one, and 18% (nine jurisdictions, including California, Colorado and Washington) mail a ballot to every registered voter.


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Q7: Excuse Required for Absentee Ballot

US States worse


Ninety-two percent of the other nations either allow no absentee ballots or require an excuse for one; 25% of US jurisdictions require an excuse. Most US jurisdictions (57%) issue an absentee ballot to anyone who asks, and 18% mail one to every voter without a request. Only four nations, Canada, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, offer no-excuse absentee voting.



Q8: Absentee Ballots Returned in Person

US States worse

Ninety-two percent of the other nations require absentee ballots, where they are allowed, to be returned in person to the election office; 25% of US jurisdictions do. The rest accept ballots by mail, drop box or other means, which adds hands between the voter and the count. Canada, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom are the only nations that accept mailed returns.




Q9: Days Mail-in Ballots Are in Circulation

US States worse

In 90% of the other nations, mail ballots are prohibited or in circulation 10 days or less; only 25% of US jurisdictions meet that standard. Nearly two-thirds of US jurisdictions (63%) send ballots out more than 20 days before the election, against 6% of the nations. The longer a ballot is outside official custody, the larger the window for loss, interception or pressure.


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Q10: Does Not Accept Late Ballots

US States worse


Ninety percent of the other nations close the count when the polls close; 69% of US jurisdictions do. Sixteen US jurisdictions still accept mail ballots that arrive after Election Day, against five of the 51 nations. A ballot that can arrive late keeps the count open and invites disputes over when it was cast.



Q11: Prohibits Ballot Harvesting

US States worse

The gap is one of the widest in the survey: 90% of the other nations prohibit third-party collection of ballots, against 12% of US jurisdictions. Twenty-five US jurisdictions limit collection to family members or helpers for disabled voters, and 20 place no limit on who may collect and return another person's ballot.




Q12: Uses NCOA to Update Voter Rolls

US States better

Every US jurisdiction (100%) uses the Postal Service's National Change of Address (NCOA) data or an equivalent address-change feed to update its rolls. Seventy-six percent of the other nations do; the 12 that do not are mostly in Africa. This is one of the US States' strongest rules.


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Q13: Checks Address Changes Monthly

US States better


All US jurisdictions check address changes at least monthly, through motor-vehicle and Postal Service data, against 75% of the other nations. The 13 nations that do not include Mexico, Ireland, Kenya and Nigeria. Prompt address updates are the main defense against voters remaining on the rolls in places they have left.



Q14: Removes Deceased Voters Monthly

US States better

Every US jurisdiction removes deceased voters at least monthly, against 73% of the other nations. The 14 nations that do not include Greece, India, the Philippines and several African countries. Monthly death matching keeps the names of the dead from accumulating on the rolls.




Q15: Updates Felon Records Promptly

US States better

All US jurisdictions update their rolls for felony convictions monthly or more often, using reports from courts and corrections agencies, against 84% of the other nations. The eight nations that do not include India, Iran, Nigeria and the United Kingdom.


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Q16: Checks Voter Rolls for Citizenship

US States worse


Eighty-two percent of the other nations check their voter rolls against a citizenship record; only 22% of US jurisdictions do. Most US jurisdictions rely on the registrant's signed oath and never compare the roll with a citizenship database. The nine nations that do not check include Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.



Q17: Voter Registration by Government Only

US States worse

Ninety-two percent of the other nations keep voter registration in government hands; only 4% of US jurisdictions do (New Hampshire and North Dakota, which has no voter registration). The other 49 US jurisdictions let private organizations collect and submit registrations. Among the nations, only Australia, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom do the same.




Q18: No Third-Party Roll Maintenance

US States worse

Ninety-four percent of the other nations use no outside groups to maintain their voter rolls; 41% of US jurisdictions can say the same. Thirty US jurisdictions use outside organizations, such as the multistate Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC), to help clean their rolls. Only Kenya, Somaliland and the United Kingdom do among the nations.


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Q19: Government Controls Roll Maintenance

US States worse


Every one of the other nations keeps control of voter-roll maintenance in government hands; 45% of US jurisdictions do. In the other 28, outside organizations such as ERIC play a role in deciding who stays on the rolls.



Q20: Allows Public Challenges to Registrations

US States worse

Eighty-eight percent of the other nations let citizens challenge a questionable registration through a formal process; 55% of US jurisdictions do. A public challenge process gives voters, parties and candidates a lawful way to act on errors they find in the rolls.




Q21: Requires Voter ID for Voting

US States worse

Eighty-four percent of the other nations require a government ID to vote with no exception. Only 22% of US jurisdictions do: 16% require a photo ID and 6% a non-photo ID. The other 78% ask for no ID or allow an exception, such as a signed affidavit, that lets a ballot count without one. Voter ID is the survey's largest question, worth 10 of 100 points.


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Q22: Requires Small Precincts

US States worse


Seventy-eight percent of the other nations keep precincts to 1,250 voters or fewer; 51% of US jurisdictions do. Small precincts mean shorter lines, poll workers who know their voters and recounts that can be finished in a day. Seven US jurisdictions average more than 2,500 voters per precinct.



Q23: Requires Paper Ballots

Same

The US States match the other nations exactly: 84% of each group use paper ballots only. In both groups, seven jurisdictions mix paper with machines that leave no paper ballot, and one uses no paper ballot at all (Louisiana in the US, Brazil among the nations). Paper ballots let a count be checked by hand from evidence the voter created.




Q24: Requires Finger Marking

US States worse

No US jurisdiction marks a voter's finger with ink, while 35% of the other nations (18 of 51) do, mostly in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Indelible ink is a simple, visible check against anyone voting twice on Election Day.


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Q25: Hand or Optical-Scan Counting

US States better


The US States edge out the other nations: 98% count paper ballots by hand or optical scanner, against 94% of the nations. Louisiana is the only US exception. Among the nations, Brazil counts without a paper ballot and France and Russia use a mix. Both groups are close to universal on this rule.



Q26: Voting Machines Tested and Certified

Same

The US States and the other nations are equal: every jurisdiction in both groups tests and certifies its voting machines before an election, or uses no machines. This is one of two rules on which both groups earn full credit.




Q27: No Machine Updates After Certification

Same

Both groups earn full credit: no jurisdiction in either group allows software updates to voting machines between certification and the election, or it uses no machines. Freezing the code after testing means a machine behaves on Election Day as it did when examined.


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Q28: Has Routine Post-Election Audits

US States worse


Eighty-six percent of the other nations require a statistically valid audit before results are certified; only 16% of US jurisdictions do. Most US jurisdictions (73%) audit only part of the count, often a fixed sample of precincts not sized to the margin. Six US jurisdictions require no audit at all, against one nation.



Q29: Vote Results in 2 Days or Less

US States better

The US States lead on speed: 76% of US jurisdictions reported 2024 results on election night, against 65% of the other nations, and 82% reported within two days, against 76%. Nine US jurisdictions took three days or more, compared with 12 nations.




Q30: Allows Public Access to Voter Rolls

US States better

The US States are slightly ahead: 63% of US jurisdictions open their voter rolls to the public for non-commercial use, against 59% of the other nations. Open rolls let candidates, journalists and citizens check the list and challenge entries that should not be there.

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Q31: Low-Cost Access to Voter Rolls

US States better

The US States lead on cost: 69% of US jurisdictions provide the voter roll for $1,000 or less and another 22% for $1,000 to $4,999, against 57% of the other nations at $1,000 or less. Most of the remaining nations do not make the roll public at all. Low cost lets candidates, journalists and citizens examine the list.

Statement on Rules Review versus Compliance Review

This study confines itself to the stated laws, rules, and policies of the Electoral Management Boards (EMB) for each state and nation. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to measure how honestly each state or nation follows their own rules. Specifically, when noting the relatively high scores that several totalitarian countries achieved in our rating system, we caution against inferring that their elections are conducted in a manner reflective of our scoring of their laws, rules, and policies.

We first noted this problem in backlash over a pioneering 2014 research project, led by Pippa Norris, Richard Frank, and Ferran Martinez, all of the Electoral Integrity Project*. Their effort was widely--and perhaps unfairly--criticized for giving North Korea an unusually high rating in their Perceptions of Electoral (PEI) database. Since their limiting premise involved the perception of conducting honest elections, those perceptions did not necessarily comport with reality in certain nations and the research begged the question of whose perception was being measured. It is still a valid problem that the world's worst nations will claim, through propaganda, to run the “most clean and honest elections” in history, while deplatforming, disappearing, torturing, or even murdering anybody who dares to point out the contradictions.

In conclusion, we would suggest that even the most corrupt dictators in the world possess a certain desire to be viewed as legitimate. Many of whom actually understand which elements of election integrity resonate with their populace. While some nations and US states may pretend to conduct open and honest elections, such live-action role playing is only a means to manufacture consent of the governed. Though we initially tried to measure the extent to which states and nations follow their own rules, we ran into the political reality when our contacts in certain unnamed totalitarian countries declined our requests for information on this delicate subject. Nonetheless, as a suggestion for further study, we cautiously urge researchers to measure how well each state's or nation's EMB is following their own published rules."

* Footnote: Norris P, Frank RW, Martínez i Coma F. Measuring Electoral Integrity around the World: A New Dataset. PS: Political Science & Politics. 2014;47(4):789-798. doi:10.1017/S1049096514001061

6. Conclusions

The Meyers Report analysts developed conclusions based on observations of data and the interviews conducted with election experts and our contributors in the different countries surveyed. We conducted a causal analysis to determine the root causes of election risk. The resulting analysis is provided below:

1. **Honor System.** The US is the only country to have an "honor" system for the citizenship, residency, and even personal identification in many circumstances when registering and voting. People applying for drivers licenses only need to check a citizenship block to be allowed to vote. Observers from other countries are surprised that we have election processes allowing an honor system in any part of the registration or voting procedure.
2. **False sense of election security.** As a result of claims by federal government officials that have been amplified in the mainstream media, some citizens in the US believe that the election system is secure, which makes election fraud impossible. They believe that risk mitigation by other countries to reduce election fraud is not needed in the US election system.
3. **Wide variation in election risk.** Election systems risk varies from country to country, and from state to state in the US. Risk scores among US states vary far greater than scores from country to country. This indicates a lack of responsibility in securing certain US state election systems.
4. **Poor US election risk scores.** Average risk scores for the US were over 32.3 points below the average of all countries. This indicates a critical risk issue in all US state election systems.
5. **Lack of risk management frameworks.** There are no risk management frameworks currently in use to assess and secure election systems, as opposed to financial and computer systems.
6. **Attempts to undermine compliance.** From a statistical standpoint, the US states had a standard deviation of 13.35, compared to 11.82 for the 51 surveyed nations. This indicates a deliberate attempt to decrease compliance in many states. It underscores the effects of a lack of US Federal security guide rails, leading to compromise of election integrity in some states.
7. **Risky design on purpose.** A causal analysis was conducted to determine the root causes of high election risk. The analysis concluded that election systems have been purposely designed to allow bad actors to adjust vote totals to have their candidates win instead of the citizens' choice. This has been observed across all 31 risk domains.
8. **US identity proofing and management.** American election law is strong at the scanner and weak at the door. The rules that make a count auditable, paper ballots, certified and frozen equipment, optical scanning and scheduled roll maintenance, are nearly universal. The rules that establish who is voting, identity, citizenship and a closed register are the exception. The average state has solved the second half of the problem and not the first.
9. **Major risk areas.** Five questions explain most of the deficit: voter ID, mail-in policy, citizenship documentation, ballot collection and the absentee window. Together they cost the average jurisdiction about 25 of its 47 lost points, and they are the same five questions on which the gap with the rest of the world is widest.
10. **The world's standard is not exotic.** A photo ID with no exception, a document proving citizenship, registration closed before election day, absentee voting only for cause and only in

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person, and no third-party ballot collection are the rules in most of Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia. These are the rules the United States had, in most states, before 2000.

11. **The partisan gap is real**, but it is a gap of degree, not of kind. Red states are graded F on average too. The difference is that red states have moved on citizenship, same-day registration, ranked-choice voting (RCV) and mail voting and blue states have moved in the opposite direction; on voter ID both groups still fall far short of the international norm because of exception forms.
12. **Swing states, where the rules matter most, are the least consistent**. Their strengths (receipt deadlines, public challenges) and weaknesses (drop boxes, long windows, exception forms) are shared across parties, and their 33-point internal spread means that the same national election is run under very different rules in Georgia and Nevada.
13. **Most of the fixes are statutory.** In every state examined so far except Michigan, the largest gains are available by ordinary legislation; Michigan's 2018 and 2022 amendments are the warning that once a loose rule is placed in a constitution, only the voters can remove it. New Hampshire is the second warning: a rule the legislature writes can be undone in court, and the state's seven-point drop in May 2026 came from a single ruling.
14. **The survey measures the rulebook**, and the rulebook is what legislatures control. Whether a permitted practice is used, or a required one enforced, is a separate question that a compliance study should answer. But a state cannot demonstrate integrity under rules that do not require it, and 40 of 51 U.S. jurisdictions are in that position.

7. Recommendations for Improvement

The following recommendations are proposed to address the root cause:

1. **Develop a standard method of risk assessment** for US election systems based on a risk management framework, and an election model based on the current NIST model of 2019.
2. **Conduct risk assessments** of all 51 states/DC and identify gaps in the laws and policies of each state.
3. **Determine the minimum standard for risk** to secure election systems and codify that standard in a federal statute. This will provide “guide rails” to raise election integrity to a minimum acceptable level of risk.
4. **Develop recommendations for improvement** for the election risk areas. Provide these recommendations to all states to allow them the opportunity to improve their risk score. These recommendations should include the following: (a) changes in laws for the state legislatures, and (b) changes in policies and processes for the state governors and secretaries of state.
5. **Develop standard compliance auditing procedures** to provide periodic audits of election processes to accredit state systems in accordance with compliance with standards. This could be implemented as a national accreditation program with auditing standards.
6. **Capture best practices**. Review the election practices of other countries and use them to improve the integrity of our election system.

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7.1. Five Recommendations to the U.S. Congress

1. **Set a federal floor for identification in federal elections**: a government-issued photo ID, issued free of charge on request, with a provisional ballot that counts only if the ID is produced before the canvass. This is the single largest gap between the United States and the world and the only one that touches every state. Congress has clear authority over the manner of federal elections under Article I, Section 4.
2. **Require documentary proof of citizenship** on the federal registration form and direct DHS to give every state free, automated access to SAVE and to the naturalization and passport databases for roll verification. The SAVE Act framework already exists; the missing piece is the data pipeline that lets a state verify without burdening the registrant.
3. **Amend the National Voter Registration Act** so that a registration is not accepted after 14 days before a federal election and so that a registrant who fails to respond to a confirmation notice is removed after one federal election cycle, not two. The two-cycle rule is why 23 million inactive registrations remain on the rolls, and it is federal law, not state law, that keeps them there.
4. **All ballots received on election day.** Require that every mail or absentee ballot in a federal election be received by the close of polls on election day and be returned by the voter, a household member or a designated caregiver, with the return channel recorded. Sixteen jurisdictions count late ballots and 20 allow unlimited collection; a single federal rule ends both and gives every state the same-night count the rest already have.
5. **Fund and require an audit** before certification in every federal election, and condition federal election assistance on state ownership of list maintenance. The audit turns the paper ballots every state already keeps into evidence; the ownership condition brings the 28 jurisdictions that outsource part of maintenance back inside government, and a federally run cross-state match, open to every state at no cost, would end the ERIC dispute by replacing a private consortium with a public one.

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7.2. Five Recommendations to the States and DC

1. **Close the exception in the photo ID law.** Most of the 40 US jurisdictions that score zero on voter ID ask for an ID and then let a signed affidavit or exception form substitute for it. Requiring the ID to be produced before the canvass, with a free ID available, is worth 10 points on the survey and moves a state further than any other single bill.

2. **Verify citizenship at registration and on the existing rolls.** Accept a passport, birth certificate, naturalization certificate or citizen-verified REAL ID, run the file against DMV and SAVE data, and publish the results. Four states do this now; the other 47 rely upon an oath, the honor system. No surveyed country has the American form of exception: a voter with no ID signs a statement about themselves and casts a regular ballot that counts without any second party or later check. Aside from the US, only Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and the United Kingdom, plus Somalia, have any form of attestation, and most of those have cross-checks the US does not. Here the US is functioning on a par with Somalia.

3. **Bring the ballot back inside official custody.** a) Issue absentee ballots no more than 20 days before the election, b) require return in person to the clerk or to an early-voting site by the voter or a family member, c) count only ballots received by the close of polls, and d) prohibit third-party collection. Where drop boxes are constitutionally required, as in Michigan, staff and record them 24/7.

4. **Close registration before election day** and keep it in government hands. Move same-day registration to the clerk's office at a minimum, as Michigan, Vermont and Wisconsin do, or end it and close registration 25 days out as 24 states do; end private registration drives by expanding registration at county offices; and adopt a public challenge process with notice and a hearing.

5. **Prohibit ranked-choice voting (RCV)** before a city adopts it, and make the audit count. Thirty jurisdictions leave RCV open by silence; a one-line prohibition preserves precinct-level, election-night, hand-auditable counts. Converting the post-election review to a margin-based audit completed before certification gives the state the one integrity tool it is paying for and not using.

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8. Follow-on Recommendations

We recommend that follow-on studies be conducted to address risk areas beyond the 31 areas in this report.

8.1 Standard set of controls. Based on the identification of risks, we recommend that a standard set of controls be developed to continually assess election systems laws and procedures, and to provide recommended law and policy/process revisions to maintain a high degree of election integrity. Follow-on studies can be done in collaboration with other countries to benefit from their election best practices.

8.2 Compliance assessment. This study did not address auditing or the assurance that laws or procedures are being adhered to. We recommend that an auditing and enforcement program be developed to provide assurance of compliance with existing laws/procedures, and accreditation of state election systems.

8.3 Correlation to political alignment. This study did not compare country/state compliance scores to the political alignment of country/state executive and legislative bodies. There appears to be a possible correlation of scores to political alignment, but there are outliers in both directions. There is a possibility that the survey methodology could be refined to identify the propensity of a governing body to attain or keep non-compliant election rules.

8.4 Adoption of Model Election Laws. The Election Integrity network (EIN) has created a set of model election laws (July 2026) designed to elevate the maturity of election rules in US states. These laws were developed by hundreds of election integrity volunteers across the United States, and are based on ten principles in the US Citizens Elections Bill of Rights. Both federal and state legislators can use these model laws to improve election risk scores and create a framework for integrity in every election in the US.

We have provided a table to crosswalk the 10 Model Election law areas to the 31 risk questions in the survey. The survey did not address area 10, and question 22 did not relate to any of the model laws. The figure provides the question, points assigned (weighting), map to the EIN Model Law (areas 1 through 10), the US election category and respective Work Breakdown System (WBS) number, the election process, and the control question for that process.

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Election Rules questions to Model Laws crosswalk (July 2026)

Question	Points	Model law	WBS	Election Category	Election Process	Control
1	3	1	1.2	Manage voters	Verify citizenship	1. Citizenship Required
2	5	1	1.2	Manage voters	Verify citizenship	2. Citizen Only Vote Documentation
3	4	3	1.2	Manage voters	Receive voter registration	3. Same Day Registration
22	4	None	1.5	Prepare voting material	Maintain Precinct Boundaries	22. Average Precinct Size
23	5	5	1.5	Prepare voting material	Lay Out Ballots	23. Paper Ballots Only
26	2	6	1.5	Prepare voting material	Perform Accuracy Testing	26. Machines Audited Certified
27	1	6	1.5	Prepare voting material	Provide report validation	27. Machine Updates After Certification
5	4	3	2.1	Vote in person	Determine remote voting eligibility	5. Early In Person Voting
21	10	2	2.1	Vote in person	Determine Initial Eligibility	21. Voter Id For Voting
24	2	4	2.1	Vote in person	Determine Initial Eligibility	24. Fingers Marked
6	11	3	2.2	Vote remotely	Send Ballot by Mail	6. Mail In Ballots
7	3	4	2.2	Vote remotely	Is requester eligible?	7. Absentee Ballot Qualification
8	2	4	2.2	Vote remotely	Mail package to voter	8. Absentee Ballot Delivery
9	4	3	2.2	Vote remotely	Voting period begins	9. Total Mail in Ballot Days
10	4	3	2.2	Vote remotely	Ballots received and processed	10. Ballots Accepted After Election Day
11	5	9	2.2	Vote remotely	Receive ballot package	11. Ballot Harvesting
4	4	9	3.1	Determine results	Tally Ballots	4. Ranked Choice Voting
25	5	5	3.1	Determine results	Tally	25. Hand Or Optical Scan Counting vs DRE
28	2	6	3.1	Determine results	Verify Vote Count	28. Post Election Audits
29	4	6	3.1	Determine results	Certify/Publish Official Results	29. Quick Election Results
12	1	4	1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	NVRA General Program	12. NCOA Voter Roll Maintenance
13	2	4	1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Confirmed current address	13. Address Change Frequency
14	1	4	1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Process Death Records	14. Death Updates for Voter Rolls
15	1	4	1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Process Court Actions	15. Felon Registration for Voter Rolls
16	1	2	1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Remove non-citizens	16. Citizenship Documentation for Voter Rolls
17	2	9	1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Verify registration is complete	17. Third Party Registration Drives
18	1	4	1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Receive voter registration	18. Third Party Roll Maintenance
19	1	9	1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Receive voter registration	19. Govt Control Third Party Maintenance
20	1	4	1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Lookup voter record	20. Public Registration List Challenges
30	2	7	1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Check for completeness	30. Public Access Voter Rolls
31	3	7	1.2.3	Maintain voter roll	Lookup voter record	31. Cost Access Voter Rolls

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Appendix A: Staff Acknowledgements

The following staff contributed to the research, development, and review of this report:

The Meyers Report Board of Directors
Edie Meyers
Jeremy Perlow
Carlos Legaspy
Barry Chapman
Paul McGonagle

Project Authors
Gary Meyers—Illinois
Barry Chapman—Virginia
Jay Delancy—North Carolina
Joe Grant—Maine
Jeremy Perlow—Florida

Research
Mason Hess—Illinois (North Central College)
Charles Grunloh—Missouri (Mississippi State University)
Robert Young—UK (London School of Economics)
James Benett— UK (London School of Economics)
Afonso Rocha—Portugal (Lisbon University School of Law)
Peter Kim—South Korea (London School of Economica)
Hunter Gracey—West Virginia (Northwestern University)

Data Review
Rob Brownsword—US (Philippines and East Asia)
John Meek—Bulgaria (Central and Eastern Europe)
Patrice Johnson—Michigan
Allison Nickolai—Ohio
Syvilla Reynolds—South Africa (Africa)
Good Governance Africa—(Africa)
Carlos Legaspy—Illinois (Latin America and Mexico)
Fatih Sahin—Ukraine (Ukraine)
Tolga Kelebek—Turkey (Turkey)

Peer Reviews

Hal Daub—Nebraska, Former Congressman
Paul McGonagle—Boston, MA, Diplomat, International Banker/Country Risk
James Womack—North Carolina, Military Veteran, War Planning, Election Integrity
Marly Hornick—New York, Election Law Expert
Bob Genetski—Clerk of Allegan County, Michigan

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Appendix B: Election Rules Survey Questions

The following 31 risk areas were selected based on an assessment of election system processes that posed the highest risk of compromise.

Control	Scoring
1. Citizenship Required	*Information on the scoring formulae is available upon request with appropriate credentials and verifications.*
2. Citizen Only Vote Documentation	
3. Same Day Registration	
4. Ranked Choice Voting	
5. Early In Person Voting	
6. Mail In Ballots	
7. Absentee Ballot Qualification	
8. Absentee Ballot Delivery	
9. Total Mail in Ballot Days	
10. Ballots Accepted After Election Day	
11. Ballot Harvesting	
12. NCOA Voter Roll Maintenance	
13. Address Change Frequency	
14. Death Updates for Voter Rolls	
15. Felon Registration for Voter Rolls	
16. Citizenship Documentation for Voter Rolls	
17. Third Party Registration Drives	
18. Third Party Roll Maintenance	
19. Govt Control Third Party Maintenance	
20. Public Registration List Challenges	

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21. Voter Id For Voting	*Information on the scoring formulae is available upon request with appropriate credentials and verifications.*
22. Average Precinct Size	
23. Paper Ballots Only	
24. Fingers Marked	
25. Hand Or Optical Scan Counting vs DRE	
26. Machines Audited Certified	
27. Machine Updates After Certification	
28. Post Election Audits	
29. Quick Election Results	
30. Public Access Voter Rolls	
31. Cost Access Voter Rolls	

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Appendix C: Election Rules Scores by Question

Jurisdiction	Code	Overall score	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	Q29	Q30	Q31
Alabama US State/DC	AL	73	A	C	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	F	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	F
Alaska US State/DC	AK	39	A	F	A	F	D	C	C	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	C	F	A	A
Arizona US State/DC	AZ	55	A	A	A	F	F	C	C	F	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	A	B	F	A	F	A	A	A	C	F	F	B
Arkansas US State/DC	AR	79	A	F	A	A	D	B	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
California US State/DC	CA	30	D	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	F	F	A
Colorado US State/DC	CO	45	A	F	F	F	D	F	F	F	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Connecticut US State/DC	CT	44	A	F	F	F	D	C	C	F	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
Delaware US State/DC	DE	63	A	F	A	F	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	F	A
Dist. of Columbia US State/DC	DC	30	D	F	F	F	B	F	F	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	C	F	A	A
Florida US State/DC	FL	63	A	C	A	A	B	C	C	F	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
Georgia US State/DC	GA	68	A	C	A	A	D	C	C	F	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	A	A	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Hawaii US State/DC	HI	40	A	F	F	F	B	F	F	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	F	A
Idaho US State/DC	ID	51	A	F	F	A	D	C	C	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
Illinois US State/DC	IL	36	D	F	F	F	F	C	C	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	B	F	A
Indiana US State/DC	IN	76	A	C	A	A	F	B	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	B	F	A	A	A	F	A	F	C
Iowa US State/DC	IA	55	A	F	F	A	D	C	C	F	C	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	B
Kansas US State/DC	KS	65	A	F	A	A	D	C	C	F	C	F	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	A	A	B	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
Kentucky US State/DC	KY	69	A	F	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	A

Jurisdiction	Code	Overall score	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	Q29	Q30	Q31
Louisiana US State/DC	LA	63	A	C	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	F	A	F	F	F	A	A	F	A	A	C
Maine US State/DC	ME	40	A	F	F	F	F	C	C	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	B
Maryland US State/DC	MD	35	D	F	F	F	B	C	C	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	A
Massachusetts US State/DC	MA	41	A	F	F	F	D	C	C	F	F	F	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	F	A
Michigan US State/DC	MI	52	A	F	D	F	B	C	C	F	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
Minnesota US State/DC	MN	46	A	F	F	F	F	C	C	F	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	F	A
Mississippi US State/DC	MS	78	A	C	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	F	B	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	B	F	A	A	A	F	A	A	B
Missouri US State/DC	MO	65	A	F	A	A	D	B	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	F	A
Montana US State/DC	MT	54	A	F	D	A	F	C	C	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
Nebraska US State/DC	NE	48	A	F	F	F	F	C	C	F	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	F	A	A	A
Nevada US State/DC	NV	35	A	F	F	F	D	F	F	F	C	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	A	B	F	A	A	A	A	F	A	A
New Hampshire US State/DC	NH	64	A	C	F	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	F	A
New Jersey US State/DC	NJ	47	A	F	A	F	B	C	C	F	F	F	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	A	B	F	A	A	A	C	B	A	A
New Mexico US State/DC	NM	44	A	F	F	F	F	C	C	F	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	F	B
New York US State/DC	NY	42	A	F	F	F	B	C	C	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	B	A	A
North Carolina US State/DC	NC	47	A	F	F	F	D	C	C	F	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
North Dakota US State/DC	ND	57	A	F	F	A	D	C	C	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	F	B	C	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	F	A

Jurisdiction	Code	Overall score	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	Q29	Q30	Q31
Ohio US State/DC	OH	71	A	C	A	A	F	C	C	F	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
Oklahoma US State/DC	OK	61	A	F	A	A	B	C	C	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	F	A	A	A
Oregon US State/DC	OR	37	A	F	A	F	D	F	F	F	C	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	C	F	A	A
Pennsylvania US State/DC	PA	54	A	F	A	F	F	C	C	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
Rhode Island US State/DC	RI	48	A	F	A	F	D	C	C	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
South Carolina US State/DC	SC	64	A	F	A	A	D	B	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	F	A	A	B
South Dakota US State/DC	SD	57	A	A	A	A	F	C	C	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	F	B
Tennessee US State/DC	TN	74	A	F	A	A	D	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	A	C	B	F	A	A	A	C	A	F	B
Texas US State/DC	TX	60	A	C	A	F	D	B	A	A	A	F	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	F	C	B	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	B
Utah US State/DC	UT	40	A	A	F	F	D	F	F	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	F	F	B
Vermont US State/DC	VT	37	D	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
Virginia US State/DC	VA	36	A	F	F	F	F	C	C	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	C
Washington US State/DC	WA	39	A	F	D	F	D	F	F	F	C	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	F	A	A
West Virginia US State/DC	WV	65	A	F	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	F	B	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	A	F	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	B
Wisconsin US State/DC	WI	58	A	F	F	F	D	C	C	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	C	A	A	F
Wyoming US State/DC	WY	63	A	A	F	A	F	C	C	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	F	B	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	A
US AVERAGE US State/DC	AVG	53	2.9	0.9	2.1	1.6	1.4	3.5	1.9	0.5	1.4	2.7	2.1	1	2	1	1	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.5	2	2.7	4.6	0	4.9	2	1	1	3.2	1.3	2.5

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Jurisdiction	Code	Overall score	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	Q29	Q30	Q31
Albania Country	ALB	94	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A
Argentina Country	ARG	97	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Australia Country	AUS	54	D	F	A	F	D	B	A	A	C	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Belarus Country	BLR	90	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F
Brazil Country	BRA	78	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	A	A	F	A	F	F
Bulgaria Country	BGR	93	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	F	A	A	A	A	B	A	A
Canada Country	CAN	52	A	F	F	A	B	C	C	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F
Chile Country	CHL	95	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
China Country	CHN	88	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	A	A
Colombia Country	COL	92	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F
Czech Repub. Country	CZE	91	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F
Ethiopia Country	ETH	89	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A
France Country	FRA	90	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	B	F	B	A	A	C	A	A	A
Germany Country	DEU	66	D	A	A	A	F	C	C	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F
Ghana Country	GHA	92	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A
Greece Country	GRC	96	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Hungary Country	HUN	92	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F
India Country	IND	77	A	C	A	F	A	B	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	C	F	A	A

Jurisdiction	Code	Overall score	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	Q29	Q30	Q31
Indonesia Country	IDN	96	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A
Iran Country	IRN	85	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F
Ireland Country	IRL	62	F	F	A	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	A	A
Israel Country	ISR	90	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	B	F	F
Italy Country	ITA	97	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Japan Country	JPN	87	A	A	A	A	D	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	C	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Kenya Country	KEN	91	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A
Mexico Country	MEX	92	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F
Morocco Country	MAR	97	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Netherlands Country	NLD	88	D	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	C	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F
New Zealand Country	NZL	60	F	F	F	F	D	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Nigeria Country	NGA	88	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A
North Korea Country	PRK	85	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	B	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F
Pakistan Country	PAK	86	A	A	A	F	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A
Peru Country	PER	89	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	C	B	F	F
Philippines Country	PHL	85	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	C	A	A	A
Poland Country	POL	86	D	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	B	F	F	

Jurisdiction	Code	Overall score	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10	Q11	Q12	Q13	Q14	Q15	Q16	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q20	Q21	Q22	Q23	Q24	Q25	Q26	Q27	Q28	Q29	Q30	Q31
Portugal Country	PRT	75	F	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F
Romania Country	ROU	97	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Russia Country	RUS	86	D	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	F	B	A	A	C	A	F	F
Rwanda Country	RWA	99	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Somalia Country	SOM	63	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	F	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	F	F	F
Somaliland Country	SML	87	A	C	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A
South Africa Country	ZAF	92	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A
South Korea Country	KOR	83	D	A	A	A	B	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F
Spain Country	ESP	73	D	A	A	A	A	C	C	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F
Sweden Country	SWE	75	D	A	A	A	D	A	A	A	A	F	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	C	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Taiwan Country	TWN	98	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Turkey Country	TUR	98	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
Uganda Country	UGA	92	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A
Ukraine Country	UKR	93	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	F
United Kingdom Country	GBR	64	F	F	A	F	A	C	C	F	C	A	B	A	A	A	F	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	F
Venezuela Country	VEN	87	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	F	F	F	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	A	A	C	A	F	F
COUNTRY AVERAGE Country	AVG	85.3	2.3	4.2	3.8	3.5	3.5	9.7	2.9	1.8	3.7	3.6	4.6	0.8	1.5	0.7	0.8	0.8	1.8	0.9	1	0.9	8.2	3.4	4.6	0.7	4.8	2	1	1.8	2.8	1.2	1.7

Question
Q1 – Citizenship Required Us And Others 1
Q2 – Citizen Only Vote Documentation States And Countries
Q3 – Same Day Registration Norm Vs States And Countries
Q4 – Ranked Choice Voting States And Countries
Q5 – Early In Person Voting States And Countries
Q6 – Mail In Ballots States And Countries
Q7 – Absentee Ballot Qualification States And Countries
Q8 – Absentee Ballot Delivery States And Countries
Q9 – Total Mail In Ballot Days States And Countries
Q10 – Ballots Accepted After Election Day
Q11 – Ballot Harvesting States And Countries
Q12 – NCOA Voter Roll Maintenance
Q13 – Address Change Frequency
Q14 – Death Updates For Voter Rolls
Q15 – Felon Registration For Voter Rolls
Q16 – Citizenship Documentation For Voter Rolls
Q17 – Third Party Registration Drives
Q18 – Third Party Roll Maintenance
Q19 – Govt Control Third Party Maintenance
Q20 – Public Registration List Challenges
Q21 – Voter Id For Voting
Q22 – Average Precinct Size
Q23 – Paper Ballots Only
Q24 – Fingers Marked
Q25 – Hand Or Optical Scan Counting versus DRE with no paper ballot.
Q26 – Machines Audited Certified
Q27 – Machine Updates After Certification
Q28 – Post Election Audits
Q29 – Quick Election Results
Q30 – Public Access Voter Rolls
Q31 – Cost Access Voter Rolls
Total

Information on the scoring formulae is available upon request with appropriate credentials and verifications.

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
Appendix D: Sample State Report

The Meyers Report

Election Rules Survey: The State of Michigan

2026 Election Rules Survey by The Meyers Report | 51 U.S. jurisdictions and 51 countries | 31 questions and 100 points

Revised edition, October 19, 2026. Incorporates the corrections recommended by the Michigan Fair Elections Institute (MFEI) in its review of October 4, 2026, and its comments of October 19, 2026. MFEI reviewed this report's statements of Michigan law for accuracy. MFEI does not endorse the survey's scoring or policy recommendations.



A. Where Michigan Stands

Michigan scores 52 of 100, a grade of F, ranking 27th among 51 U.S. jurisdictions. It stands 1.0 point below the U.S. average of 53.0 and 33.3 below the country average of 85.3. The Legislature should preserve paper evidence, public records and official review while addressing the survey's eligibility and absentee benchmarks. Twelve priorities model a conditional path to 91, a B. Several require constitutional change and cannot be implemented by ordinary legislation alone. [1, 2]

The survey measures written rules under a particular rubric; it does not measure fraud or establish an election's accuracy. A state that requires a drop box in every city is not a state where every voter uses one, and a state whose ID law allows an affidavit is not a state where every voter signs one. Michigan's grade therefore describes the latitude its law allows, not the conduct of its clerks or voters. That distinction matters because written rules are what a legislature, or in Michigan's case the voters can change. The report therefore measures only half the picture. Acceptable written rules can coexist with weak administration: the Michigan Fair Elections Institute's own research reports a ratio of total registrations to citizen voting-age population of 108.9% (May 2026) and about 345,000 long-inactive registrations still coded active as of April 2026, down from 558,627 in an earlier snapshot, findings that lie outside this survey's scope. Figures and maps use the October 16, 2026, snapshot and original 100-point weights. The assigned score remains 52. The narrative distinguishes constitutional rights, current procedures, older source shorthand and proposals. It does not

assume that a pending initiative becomes law or that compliance with this rubric overrides an existing voting right. [1, 27, 28]

Twenty-six U.S. jurisdictions score above Michigan and 24 score lower; no other jurisdiction shares 52. Indiana scores 76, Ohio 71, Kentucky 69, Florida 63, Texas 60, Wisconsin 58 and Iowa 55. Nebraska scores 48, Minnesota 46, Colorado 45 and Illinois 36. Arkansas leads at 79, followed by Mississippi 78 and Indiana. Michigan's middle domestic position leaves 48 points unearned under this survey's preferences. Its strongest categories should remain visible beside those gaps. [1]

Michigan ranks seventh in the nine-state Midwest comparison: Indiana 76, Ohio 71, Kentucky 69, Missouri 65, Wisconsin 58, Iowa 55, Michigan 52, Minnesota 46 and Illinois 36. The group averages 58.7, leaving Michigan 6.7 points below it. Its two southern neighbors, Ohio and Indiana, score 19 and 24 points more, and its western neighbor Wisconsin scores six points more. Comparisons by 2024 presidential result are kept out of this state analysis so that nonpartisan organizations can cite it; they remain in the national report. [1]

Fifty of 51 surveyed countries score above Michigan. Canada shares 52; none scores lower. Australia scores 54, New Zealand 60, Ireland 62, the United Kingdom 64, Germany 66, Japan 87, France 90 and Mexico 92. Regional country means are Africa 89.0, Asia including the Middle East 88.2, Eastern Europe 91.3, Western Europe 78.6, South America 89.7 and Australia/New Zealand 57.0. Canada and Mexico average 72.0. These comparisons describe rubric scores, not proof of one country's election performance. The survey grades written rules, not whether elections are free and fair. Russia (86), China (88), Iran (85) and North Korea (85) outscore every U.S. state on this rubric because their statutes read strictly, not because their elections are honest; readers should weigh the international comparison accordingly. [1]

Michigan earns full credit on 14 questions, zero on 10 and partial credit on seven. Paper ballots and scanning provide 10 points; equipment controls three; official maintenance five; public voter-file access and cost five. The source also credits rapid historical reporting and ordinary election-day receipt. The largest gaps concern identification, documentary citizenship, absentee rules and ranked-choice voting (RCV). Several disputed policy choices are protected by the Michigan Constitution, so a proposed score path must explain the route to lawful change. [1, 2]

Three qualifications matter. Q10's four points describe ordinary receipt, not every military and overseas ballot; under Article II, §4(1)(b), military and overseas ballots postmarked on or before election day are timely if received within six days after the election, and a bar code or tracking mark counts as a postmark, so Michigan does accept some ballots after election day; Q10 is flagged for rescoring. Q28's one point should not be explained as if Michigan stopped at a 2020 pilot: the state reports a statewide statistical presidential audit after 2024. Q5's three points use the nine-day minimum, while local schedules may run longer: MCL 168.720e(5), added by Public Act 81 of 2023, lets a clerk offer additional days on or after the 29th day before the election, so early voting may run up to 29 days; Q5 is flagged for rescoring. These two items, and the Q22 precinct limit discussed in Section C, are flagged for the next edition of the survey. The score is held at 52 for now because every jurisdiction was scored from the same October 16, 2026 database snapshot; rescoring one state by hand would make Michigan's grade and rank incomparable with the other 50 jurisdictions and the national report. The corrections go to the survey database so that the next snapshot

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rescores every state on the same basis. The source's low voter-file price also needs a current quote for the requested product. [1, 3, 4, 5]

Michigan and the comparison groups

Measure	Michigan	U.S. average	Country average
Total score of 100	52	53.0	85.3
Grade	F	F	B
Rank among U.S. jurisdictions	27 of 51	-	-
Countries scoring above Michigan	50 of 51	-	-
Rank among nine Midwest states	7 of 9	-	-
Questions at full credit	14 of 31	-	-
Questions at zero	10 of 31	-	-
Voter ID Q21 of 10	0	2.0	8.2
Mail-in ballots Q6 of 11	3	3.5	9.7
Ballot collection Q11 of 5	3	2.1	4.6
Post-election audit Q28 of 2	1	1.0	1.8

Scores, rankings, means and maps use the October 16, 2026, snapshot. Original maxima total 100. Current legal qualifications do not silently alter the official assignments or the conditional scenario. [1]

B. Safeguards Worth Preserving

Michigan's credited rules provide records that can be examined, corrected and compared. These 10 groups identify what should survive any policy revision. The score is a measure of the survey's preferences; a zero on one question does not mean the entire voting process lacks controls. Practical implementation matters alongside the text of a law.

1. Citizen eligibility (Q1, 3 of 3). Article II, §1 of the constitution makes every U.S. citizen who meets the age and residency requirements an elector. It grants the vote to citizens; it does not expressly bar noncitizens, the gap the Americans for Citizen Voting petition sought to close. The survey's full credit reflects the grant, not an express bar, and the state's credit here should be read with that limit. Preserve sworn answers and official examination of conflicting evidence. An oath or identity match is not a citizenship document. Q2 and Q16's zeros concern documentation, not whether noncitizens are legally eligible. [1, 6, 15]

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2. Registration at an official office (Q3, 3 of 4). Eligible residents may register through election day at their city or township clerk with residency evidence under MCL 168.497; a late registrant must appear at the clerk's office, not a polling place, and the clerk can check the Qualified Voter File before issuing a ballot. Twenty-four U.S. jurisdictions score zero on this question; Michigan keeps the verification step. This route is not limited to movers. Preserve accountable processing and directions. It differs from precinct registration; ending it would require addressing the constitutional right in Article II, §4(1)(f). [1, 2, 6]

3. A short required early period (Q5, 3 of 4). The survey credits the nine-day minimum, while communities may offer up to 29 days. MCL 168.720b sets the required nine consecutive days, from the second Saturday before the election through the Sunday before, at least eight hours a day; MCL 168.720e(5) and Article II, §4(1)(m) let a clerk open sites for additional days at the clerk's discretion, so nine days is the minimum, not a limit. Optional Monday voting begins in 2026. Preserve secure tabulation and adequate service. Nine days is a floor, not a uniform schedule; a 10-day cap would preserve three points. [1, 5, 16]

4. Ordinary receipt and limited assistance (Q10 and Q11, 7 of 9). The ordinary deadline is 8 p.m. election day; military and overseas ballots have a timely-postmark and six-day receipt exception under Article II, §4(1)(b). Sixteen U.S. jurisdictions accept domestic ballots after election day; Michigan does not. Preserve custody and protected assistance. MCL 168.932(f) limits possession and return of an absent voter ballot to the voter, immediate family members, household members, mail carriers, and clerks and their assistants. There is no caregiver category in Michigan law; a voter who cannot return a ballot may ask the clerk for pickup under MCL 168.764b. This is a tighter rule than unlimited collection, which is why Michigan earns three of five points. [1, 3, 17]

5. Regular official maintenance (Q12-Q15, 5 assigned points). The source credits address, death and incarceration information. The state runs National Change of Address matching at least annually, receives Secretary of State address changes continuously, and removes incarcerated felons on court and corrections reports. Deceased voters are cancelled at least monthly under MCL 168.509o(4), which requires the Secretary of State to use Social Security death data; MCL 168.510, sometimes cited for this duty, concerns a clerk's effort to void the absentee ballots of voters who die before election day. Preserve accurate matching, notice and restored eligibility. Q15's raw half point differs from its official one; keep the assigned point. ERIC may supply useful information despite separate rubric deductions. Its reports do not themselves cancel registrations. [1, 7, 18]

6. Retained paper and scanning (Q23 and Q25, 10 of 10). The database records retained paper ballots, including accessible-device-produced paper, counted by certified scanners. The count can be reconstructed by hand from physical evidence the voter created, so software errors, tabulator malfunctions and allegations of manipulation can all be resolved by going back to the paper. The strength belongs to the paper itself. Ballot images and hash checks are derivative digital records that can stand in for the paper, and neither is independent proof that a count is correct; any decision made from an image should be verified against the ballot. The paper protects the count only if someone examines it: Michigan's audits occur after certification, are not sized to the margin, and the Auditor General's 2022 audit (Finding 3) found that about 17% of completed county

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audits did not hand count the assigned race. Preserve storage, accounting and accessible voting. A paper-producing marking device is not a paperless DRE. Describe Michigan's actual system rather than copy generic DRE language into certification items. [1, 8, 19]

7. Certified configurations and testing (Q26 and Q27, 3 of 3). Tabulators are tested and certified by the Board of State Canvassers before use. Preserve approved versions and tests of the final configuration. The source describes Board of State Canvassers reapproval of changes, not an absolute ban on every authorized upgrade. That reapproval step has a tradeoff: CISA notes that certification lockdowns can leave known vulnerabilities unpatched for months or years, and the federal investigation reported by Reuters in October 2026 found outdated software among the fixable weaknesses it identified. Frozen, certified code protects against unauthorized change only if it is also current and secure; the dependable safeguard remains hand-count audits of the paper. Document approval, testing and custody so the system actually used can be examined later. [1, 8, 9, 20]

8. Official challenges (Q20, 1 of 1). The source credits a registered voter's affidavit before the clerk under MCL 168.512. Preserve evidence, notice and correction. Public scrutiny should lead to official decisions, not private removal or an inference from a name alone. Better administration supports accountability while preserving lawful registration; it earns no second challenge point. [1]

9. Audits and timely reporting (Q28 and Q29, 5 of 6). The state's 2024 review describes procedural checks and a statewide statistical presidential audit after certification and recounts. Post-election audits under MCL 168.31a occur after certification; Article II, §4(1)(l) guarantees audits "in such a manner as prescribed by law" but does not set their timing. The Auditor General made the same point in its March 2022 audit (Observation 2), noting that 25 of 33 states with audit requirements finish before certification and that moving Michigan's audits earlier would likely require a longer canvass period. Preserve review while improving timing. Q29 credits one-day substantially complete unofficial 2024 reporting, not certification or every future race. Michigan reported its 2024 general election results on election night, a sharp improvement over 2020. Limited pre-processing of absentee ballots began under Public Act 177 of 2020 and was expanded in 2023; absentee counting boards may now begin tabulation eight days before the election. Prompt reporting and independent checks should reinforce each other. [1, 4, 16, 21]

10. Public access at a low assigned cost (Q30 and Q31, 5 of 5). The survey records public access and approximately $23, with $22.50 in detail. That price is unverified. The Bureau of Elections' Qualified Voter File Data Request Form (Rev. 03/26) states no price, no section of the Michigan Election Law sets one, and requests go through the Department's FOIA process, where fees are presumably governed by MCL 15.234; requesters receive a quote after submitting the form, and cost depends on scope and add-ons. The form contains no non-commercial-use condition. Several fields are exempt from disclosure, including driver license or state ID number, month and day of birth, telephone number, email address, digitized signature and the last four digits of the Social Security number, so public requesters receive year of birth only and cannot replicate full-birthdate matching of the kind the Auditor General performed. State guidance confirms records with confidential fields removed. Preserve usable access and privacy; obtain a current quote for the exact extract. These questions already receive full credit. [1, 10, 22]

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Michigan should retain its paper record, official responsibility and practical public scrutiny. A change in one category should not weaken those existing controls. The analysis below identifies where the survey seeks different rules and where updated source descriptions are necessary. A sound recommendation connects a specific legal change to a specific benchmark and explains what evidence would establish compliance.

C. Weaknesses Requiring Action

Michigan leaves 48 points unearned on 17 questions. The 10 groups below explain the main gaps under this survey. They distinguish policy preferences from demonstrated failures and identify rights that ordinary legislation cannot displace. None of these score differences alone proves fraud, misconduct or an incorrect election result.

1. An affidavit alternative to photo ID (Q21, 0 of 10). Voters possessing qualifying ID must present it, while those without it may sign an affidavit and cast a regular ballot under MCL 168.523, now protected in the constitution at Article II, §4(1)(g). The rubric prefers strict photo identification. This is the survey's largest single point loss; 37 of the 51 countries, and only eight U.S. jurisdictions since New Hampshire's May 2026 court ruling, require a photo ID with no exceptions. The report favors free qualifying credentials and a correction route, but replacing the protected alternative requires constitutional change. Zero does not mean Michigan never asks for identification. [1, 2, 11, 31]

2. Attestation rather than universal citizenship documents (Q2 and Q16, 0 of 6). MCL 168.495 requires only an attestation of citizenship, so the zero score for written rules stands. Since April 2025 the Bureau of Elections has run quarterly SAVE checks on registrants whose driver license or state ID record shows a change in citizenship eligibility, and it marks a registration rejected when the voter does not affirm eligibility within 30 days; that is an administrative procedure, not a statute. The Auditor General's August 28, 2026 letter supplies the relevant evidence: 18,523 registered electors are flagged as noncitizens in the state's driver license system (CARS), and of a random sample of 25 that the Bureau ran through SAVE, nine (36%) were confirmed noncitizens, none of whom had voted between January 2022 and March 2026. The Auditor General concluded that the CARS flag alone is not sufficient to cancel a registration and that additional confirmation should occur first. A sample of 25 cannot estimate how many of the 18,523 are noncitizens, but it shows what a documentary check would find. The report favors reliable evidence and official verification with free access and correction. Federal forms and controlling orders must be respected. The survey's older reference to a pending citizenship initiative is not treated as enacted law or current ballot status; the official November question list does not include that measure. [1, 6, 12, 13, 21]

3. No-excuse mail and continuing enrollment (Q6 and Q7, 5 of 14). The source records a right to no-excuse absentee voting during the 40 days before an election under Article II, §4(1)(h), and an opted-in permanent ballot list. Under Article II, §4(1)(k) and MCL 168.759e a voter submits one signed application covering all future elections, after which the clerk must send an absent voter ballot before every election with no new application. The status ends only if the voter asks, is no longer qualified, is reliably reported to have moved, or does not vote for six consecutive years (MCL

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168.759e(3)); a voter who moves within Michigan and updates the registration keeps the status and the ballot follows to the new address (MCL 168.759e(6)). Ballots on the list are therefore sent automatically, not only on request to a newly confirmed address. This is not automatic mailing to every registrant. The report favors an excuse requirement, preserving required exceptions. That requires a constitutional route. Corrected Q7 assigns two for no-excuse requests and three for an excuse requirement. [1, 2, 3]

4. A 40-day ordinary absentee period (Q9, 0 of 4). The survey records 40 days, also reflected in the constitutional framework at Article II, §4(1)(h). The report favors 10 days for ordinary domestic availability. Shortening an application deadline alone would not meet the benchmark. Any lawful change must address the protected period and preserve separate military and overseas transmission requirements, rather than apply a domestic limit to those voters. [1, 2, 14]

5. Multiple return channels (Q8, 0 of 2). Mail, drop boxes and clerk delivery are available. The 2022 amendment requires a drop box in every municipality and one for every 15,000 registered voters, under Article II, §4(1)(j), and MCL 168.761d sets detailed custody rules: each box must be locked and anchored in a well-lit public area (761d(6)); under video monitoring for the 75 days before each election and on election day, required for every box since January 1, 2026 (761d(7)); emptied only by the clerk, a deputy clerk or sworn clerk staff (761d(9)), on every business day beginning 35 days out (761d(11)); with ballots carried in an approved container (761d(13)) and each collection logged by date, collector and location and kept for 22 months (761d(14)). The custody record is nonetheless thinner than for in-person return: the video need not be stored (761d(2)) and boxes at clerk offices are exempt from the collection log (761d(14)). Publicly livestreamed video of every box would partially close that gap. Current guidance also permits voter tabulation of an issued absentee ballot at an eligible polling location, with a Detroit exception. The source's blanket no-precinct wording is outdated. The report favors supervised office handoff under the rubric; closing boxes alone would not satisfy it while other ordinary return routes remain. [1, 3, 23]

6. Same-day registration remains available (Q3, 3 of 4). Office processing and residency evidence already earn three points. The remaining point favors advance registration only. Even at the clerk's office, an election-day registrant's prior registrations elsewhere cannot be confirmed before voting, and registration closes before election day in 48 of the 51 countries. The report proposes a defined advance cutoff, convenient channels and correction, through the required constitutional process for Article II, §4(1)(f). Do not describe the existing right as precinct-wide registration without checks or claim four new points for a one-point gap. [1, 2, 6]

7. No prohibition in the ranked-choice voting (RCV) category (Q4, 0 of 4). The database describes local adoption efforts in Ann Arbor, East Lansing and Kalamazoo awaiting enabling law rather than statewide operational use. The Michigan Supreme Court struck down a ranked-ballot proportional representation system in Kalamazoo in 1920 (Wattles ex rel. Johnson v. Upjohn, 211 Mich. 514); that case did not address the single-winner ranked-choice voting (RCV) now proposed by local charters. No current statute authorizes or bans RCV, and local charter adoptions cannot take effect without state action. Ranked-choice tabulation requires central computer processing, produces exhausted ballots and is difficult to audit; it is prohibited in 45 of the 51 countries. The report favors a clear conventional-count requirement within the survey's scope. Verify state and

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local implementation before rescoring; an introduced bill, charter provision or campaign statement is not sufficient evidence that a new statewide voting method is already operating. [1, 24]

8. Administrative precinct size (Q22, 2 of 4). The approximate 8.4 million registrations and 4,800 precincts yield 1,750 per precinct. That figure is an inference rather than a reported number: the Auditor General's March 2022 audit lists 4,756 precincts statewide for the November 2020 election, when the voter file held about 8.0 million registrations. Michigan's legal limit is set by MCL 168.661(2), which caps a precinct at 4,999 active registered electors when precincts are redivided after each census; the survey's 2,500-voter ceiling is its own benchmark, not Michigan law. Because the survey grades written rules, a statutory limit nearly double that ceiling arguably warrants a lower Q22 score than 2 of 4 (flagged for the next edition; the score is held for the reason given in Section A), and statutory precinct limits do not apply to early voting sites (Article II, §4(1)(m)). The full benchmark is 1,250 or less. Verify current totals before changing boundaries, staffing or sites. Administrative precincts, early-voting sites and physical polling locations are different measures. A lower ratio alone does not prove shorter lines or better access. [1, 19, 25]

9. Outside registration and maintenance (Q17-Q19, 0 of 4). Private drives are permitted and Michigan belongs to ERIC. All 51 countries keep list maintenance within government. The rubric favors public-only functions; the report proposes accountable official processes while preserving useful matching and assistance. ERIC returns information and officials retain legal responsibility. A substitute must satisfy both outside-maintenance categories; changing an organization name or ending membership without replacement checks is insufficient. [1, 7, 13]

10. Audit timing and unclaimed categories (Q28, 1 of 2). Broader review before final certification with escalation is proposed. Michigan's 2024 statewide statistical audit must not be omitted or described merely as a 2020 pilot. The report also leaves finger marking, mail prohibition and collection prohibition unclaimed. Existing early-voting credit depends on the minimum rather than a uniform local ceiling. These distinctions keep the prospective arithmetic honest. [1, 4, 5]

The common thread is narrower than it first appears. The citizenship attestation at registration predates 2018, and the affidavit alternative to photo ID stood in statute (MCL 168.523) long before the 2022 amendment placed it in the constitution; the amendments did not create self-certification, they protected it from ordinary legislation. Absentee ballots pass through signature verification under MCL 168.761 and 168.766, so the state can show more about who cast a ballot than a bare attestation would suggest. The fair point is this: at the two points that matter most, the polls and registration, the written rules allow an affidavit or attestation in place of documentary proof, so the state cannot demonstrate with a document that the person on the roll is a citizen or that the person who signed the affidavit is the person on the roll. The constitutional route is part of the recommendation, not an optional footnote. Current officials must administer existing rights while a proposal is debated. Review the source's audit, precinct-return and early-schedule descriptions separately; a source correction changes the baseline and requires the model to be recalculated. [2, 11, 29]

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D. Concrete Legislative Priorities

Starting from 52, five modeled priorities reach 79, a C; nine reach 87, a B; all 12 finish at 91, also a B. The final item preserves existing credit and adds zero. Several proposals require voter-approved constitutional amendments before implementation, plus compliance with federal law and controlling orders. The Legislature can propose an amendment to Article II by a two-thirds vote of each house, or citizens can propose one by petition, and the voters must approve it. The model assumes the full specified benchmarks; it does not predict enactment, future ballot results or measured reductions in fraud. [1, 2]

1. Meet the strict photo-ID benchmark (Q21, +10). Use the required constitutional process to amend Article II, §4(1)(g), provide free qualifying credentials, accessible issuance and lawful correction. A request for ID already exists; the gain assumes the full strict category replaces the affidavit alternative lawfully. Merely distributing more IDs does not earn 10 points. Cumulative score: 62, an F. [1, 2, 11]

2. Establish qualifying citizenship verification (Q2 and Q16, +6). Provide reliable documentation, free access and review of mismatches while resolving federal-form obligations. Documentary proof of citizenship on the federal registration form conflicts with Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona (2013); the pending Supreme Court case on proof of citizenship (RNC v. Mi Familia Vota, No. 25-1017, review granted June 29, 2026) could change that, so this item is possible pending litigation, not within reach today. The Bureau's quarterly SAVE checks and the Auditor General's CARS finding show that records checks on the existing roll are already feasible under state authority. A historical database flag alone is insufficient. The model moves Q2 to five and Q16 to one, distinct scored questions under one coordinated proposal. Cumulative score: 68, a D. [1, 6, 13, 21, 26, 30]

3. Require an excuse for ordinary mail requests (Q6 and Q7, +5). Amend the constitutional framework lawfully at Article II, §4(1)(h) and §4(1)(k) and provide clear exceptions and a transition for permanent-list voters. Q6 rises from three to seven and Q7 from two to three. Mail prohibition's remaining four points are not assumed. Cumulative score: 73, a D. [1, 2]

4. Set a 10-day ordinary domestic mail window (Q9, +4). Resolve the constitutional 40-day right before implementation. Coordinate preparation, delivery and receipt; an application cutoff alone is insufficient. Preserve military and overseas transmission and receipt rules. The full availability category is assumed. Cumulative score: 77, a C. [1, 2, 14]

5. Use supervised office handoff for ordinary return (Q8, +2). Address the protected return choices in Article II, §4(1)(j) through the required constitutional process, with documented custody and lawful assistance. Any proposal should start from the custody rules MCL 168.761d already imposes on drop boxes and explain what in-person handoff adds; a caregiver return category is not proposed, because Michigan law has none and creating one would expand who may handle ballots. A box-only change does not satisfy the full category while postal and other return routes remain. Five modeled priorities add 27 points, reaching 79, a C. [1, 2, 3, 17, 23]

6. Adopt an advance-registration cutoff (Q3, +1). Use the required constitutional route to amend Article II, §4(1)(f) and retain convenient application channels, receipts and error correction. Office

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same-day registration already earns three points. The gain assumes the full four-point advance-only category, not a change in where a clerk serves voters. Cumulative score: 80, a C. [1, 2, 6]

7. Require conventional counting explicitly (Q4, +4). Resolve the statewide and local scope and provide transition instructions for any affected charter provisions. Acting now, before the Legislature enables the local charters that have adopted ranked-choice voting (RCV), preserves precinct-level, election-night, hand-auditable counts. Verify operative law and practice. The model assumes the prohibition category is actually met; it does not claim that Michigan currently conducts statewide ranked-choice voting (RCV) elections. Cumulative score: 84, a B. [1, 24]

8. Meet the precinct-size benchmark (Q22, +2). Verify registrations and administrative precincts, starting from the Auditor General's 4,756-precinct count and MCL 168.661(2)'s 4,999-elector limit, then fund boundaries and capacity to meet 1,250 or less. At the source's fixed 8.4 million registrations, at least 6,720 precincts would be needed. Evaluate actual service locations separately. Cumulative score: 86, a B. [1, 25]

9. Strengthen audits before certification (Q28, +1). Preserve existing statistical and procedural reviews while creating a lawful, outcome-focused check with escalation and correction before final certification. The check should be a hand count of the paper ballots, done correctly and completed before the Board of State Canvassers certifies. The Michigan Fair Elections Institute's view is that Michigan's post-election audit does not meet the standards of an audit under the GAO's Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (the Yellow Book), and that a reliable check would hand count the paper ballots and reconcile ballots to voters before certification. The Auditor General's 2022 audit noted that moving audits before certification would likely require a longer canvass period. Align ballot-access and certification rules and fund staff. Full two-point compliance is assumed; the existing statewide audit is acknowledged. Nine priorities reach 87, a B. [1, 4, 16]

10. Make registration intake publicly accountable (Q17, +2). Fund official channels, receipts, delivery tracking and assistance. Resolve NVRA distribution and registration duties before changing private drives. Courts have generally allowed states to regulate registration drives but not to ban them, so an outright end to private drives would face First Amendment and NVRA challenges; this priority is framed as regulation of drives, with registration at official channels, rather than a ban. Better supervision alone does not satisfy the public-only category. Demonstrate that eligible residents can use the replacement process. Cumulative score: 89, a B. [1, 13]

11. Replace disqualifying outside maintenance functions (Q18 and Q19, +2). Inventory data flows and establish a qualifying official process while retaining interstate, address and death checks, notice and correction. Officials already retain legal responsibility. Both rubric conditions must be met; ending ERIC membership alone earns no automatic gain. Cumulative score: 91, a B. [1, 7]

12. Keep ordinary early voting within 10 days (Q5, no added points). Preserve the constitutional nine-day minimum and adequate hours; use the necessary legal route to address longer local schedules, which means amending Article II, §4(1)(m) and repealing or limiting MCL 168.720e(5), since both now allow a clerk to run early voting for up to 29 days. The assigned three points are already included, so no new gain is claimed. All 12 finish at 91, a B. The nine unclaimed points are

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early prohibition one, mail prohibition four, collection prohibition two and finger marking two. [1, 2, 5, 16]

Why these reduce risk. Michigan already does the hard part well: it counts paper ballots on certified machines, reports on election night, runs its required list-maintenance processes and keeps them open to inspection. None of these recommendations touches that. They add verification at the points where the state's rules now rely on a signature instead of a document, the affidavit at the polls and the oath at registration, and they shorten the time and reduce the number of hands the law allows between the voter and the scanner. Reliable eligibility evidence makes disputed records reviewable; documented custody and retained paper support reconciliation. Meaningful audits provide independent examination, while accessible public records permit scrutiny and official correction. Michigan should preserve existing controls and assess implementation with evidence. The modeled path expresses compliance with this survey; its practical value depends on lawful design, usable service and competent administration.

E. Sources and Calculation Notes

[1] Survey and calculations. October 16, 2026 snapshot; Final Combined Election Rules Survey V12. Original maxima total 100; unweighted means, rounded once. Cutoffs A92, B82, C75, D65. Q7 maximum three. Official scores retained; no duplicate gains. Midwest comparison group: IN, OH, KY, MO, WI, IA, MI, MN and IL.

[2] Constitutional framework. Michigan Constitution, Article II section 4: registration, ID alternatives, absentee availability and return, early voting and audits. Several recommendations require constitutional change. https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-Article-II-4

[3] Absentee procedures. SOS current return routes, authorized returners, permanent-list enrollment and ordinary eight-p.m. receipt; military/overseas timely-postmark and six-day exception. https://www.michigan.gov/sos/elections/voting/absentee-voting

[4] Current audit evidence. Bureau of Elections July 2025 report on November 2024: procedural reviews and a statewide statistical presidential audit after certification and recounts. https://www.michigan.gov/sos/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/Elections/Ballot-Access/November-2024-post-election-audit-report.pdf

[5] Early voting. SOS nine-day minimum, optional longer schedules up to 29 days and optional Monday beginning in 2026. https://www.michigan.gov/sos/elections/voting/early-in-person-voting

[6] Registration. SOS citizen eligibility, office registration and residence evidence. https://www.michigan.gov/sos/elections/voting/register-to-vote

[7] ERIC and official responsibility. Current primary membership list includes Michigan. https://ericstates.org/about/

[8] Paper and security. SOS retained paper, canvass, certification and audit information. https://www.michigan.gov/sos/elections/security

[9] Approved system changes. Bureau director opinion on Board-approved hardware/software changes. https://www.michigan.gov/sos/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/Elections/Election-transparency/9-Director-of-Elections-Opinions.pdf

[10] Public records. SOS FOIA exemptions guide. Survey cost detail $22.50, rounded $23, is not a verified current quote. https://www.michigan.gov/sos/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/Elections/Election-transparency-3/MDOS0001202.pdf

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[11] Identification. Current SOS guidance: possessors present ID; voters without it may sign an affidavit and cast a ballot. https://www.michigan.gov/sos/elections/voting/vote-on-election-day

[12] 2026 ballot status. Official November list contains convention and campaign-finance proposals, not the source-described citizenship initiative. https://www.michigan.gov/sos/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/Elections/Home/Documents/2026-November-ballot-questions.pdf

[13] Federal registration requirements. DOJ NVRA guidance. https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-registration-act-1993-nvra

[14] Military and overseas procedures. Article II section 4 and SOS guidance. https://www.michigan.gov/sos/elections/voting/military-and-overseas-voters

[15] Michigan Constitution of 1963, Article II, §1 (qualifications of electors). https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-Article-II-1

[16] Michigan Office of the Auditor General, Performance Audit of the Bureau of Elections, Report No. 231-0235-21 (March 2022), Observation 2 and Finding 3. https://audgen.michigan.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/r231023521.pdf. Early voting: MCL 168.720b and 168.720e. https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-168-720e

[17] Ballot possession and return. MCL 168.932(f) (https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-168-932); MCL 168.764b, clerk collection (https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-168-764b).

[18] Monthly death cancellations. MCL 168.509o(4). https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-168-509o

[19] Michigan Office of the Auditor General, Performance Audit of the Bureau of Elections, Report No. 231-0235-19 (December 2019). https://audgen.michigan.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/r231023519.pdf

[20] CISA election infrastructure report and CIA Note, "Summary of Select Intelligence Reporting from 2004-2020 on Venezuela's Electronic Voting Manipulation Capabilities" (June 29, 2026), posted at https://www.whitehouse.gov/election-integrity/; Reuters, October 2, 2026, investigation based largely on unnamed sources.

[21] Michigan Office of the Auditor General, letter examining the Department of State's voter roll procedures under Public Act 22 of 2025 (August 28, 2026), pp. 10-11. https://audgen.michigan.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/r231023726.pdf

[22] Bureau of Elections, Qualified Voter File Data Request Form and Instructions (Rev. 03/26); Michigan FOIA fees, MCL 15.234 (https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-15-234); Department of State FOIA procedures and guidelines.

[23] Drop boxes. MCL 168.761d. https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-168-761d

[24] Wattles ex rel. Johnson v. Upjohn, 211 Mich. 514, 179 N.W. 335 (1920). https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7997207/wattles-ex-rel-johnson-v-upjohn/

[25] Precinct limits. MCL 168.661(2). https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-168-661

[26] Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013). https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/570/1/

[27] Michigan Fair Elections Institute, "Michigan Voter Rolls Shed 213,000 Ghost Registrations After Citizen Advocacy Campaign" (May 2026): 8,331,635 QVF registrations (May 19, 2026) against a Census citizen voting-age population of 7,653,711; 345,263 long-inactive registrations still coded active as of April 1, 2026.

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https://www.mifairelections.org/post/michigan-voter-rolls-shed-213-000-ghost-registrations-after-citizen-advocacy-campaign

[28] Michigan Fair Elections Institute, Ensuring Electoral Integrity: Michigan's Voter Roll Maintenance (September 2025): FOIA analysis identifying 558,627 long-inactive registrations coded active in an earlier QVF snapshot. https://b6d83fed-d9cb-4cb1-9e2f-60cfa1575f8d.filesusr.com/ugd/aa3979_19590918257d4e56bbb0025332edae32.pdf

[29] Affidavit and signature verification. MCL 168.523 (identification and affidavit at the polls), https://legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=MCL-168-523; MCL 168.761 (absentee application signature verification), https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-168-761; MCL 168.766 (absentee return envelope signature verification), https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=MCL-168-766


[30] Republican National Committee v. Mi Familia Vota, No. 25-1017 (U.S.), certiorari granted June 29, 2026. https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-1017.html

[31] New Hampshire Youth Movement v. Scanlan, consolidated with Coalition for Open Democracy v. Formella (D.N.H., May 28, 2026, Elliott, J.), striking the HB 1569 provisions that removed the qualified-voter affidavit at registration and the election-day affidavit for challenged voters; the state has appealed. https://news.ballotpedia.org/2026/06/02/federal-judge-strikes-down-part-of-new-hampshires-documentary-proof-of-citizenship-law/


Reviewer: Michigan Fair Elections Institute, Assessment of The Meyers Report: Michigan Election Rules Survey (2026), October 4, 2026. The corrections recommended in that assessment are incorporated in this edition. MFEI reviewed this report's statements of Michigan law for accuracy. MFEI does not endorse the survey's scoring or policy recommendations. MFEI's comments of October 19, 2026 are incorporated in this revised edition.

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Map 1 Michigan and eight Midwest comparison states



Map 2 All 50 states and the District of Columbia



Map 3 The 51 surveyed countries

